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Organic Tendencies in Medieval Political Thought

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Ewart Lewis
Affiliation:
Western Reserve University

Extract

The purpose of this paper is a re-examination of the thesis set forth by Otto von Gierke: that in medieval political theory there were certain organic tendencies which, because the jurists failed to develop the concept of the real personality of the group, ultimately gave way to an atomistic construction of the state. The paper is not concerned with the actual structure of medieval society, nor with the legal concepts of jurists, but with the theoretical doctrines of the publicists which Gierke interprets in that section of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht which, in Maitland's translation, has become a classic for students of political theory. It is my contention that, while his treatment of subordinate issues of medieval political theory is often masterly, Gierke's main theses in regard to the medieval concepts of the nature of the group, the relation of officers to the group, and the relation of groups to one another are fundamentally inaccurate.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1938

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References

1 Gierke, Otto, Political Theories of the Middle Age, tr. Maitland, F. W. (Cambridge, 1900)Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., p. 3.

3 Ibid., p. 7.

4 Ibid., p. 21.

5 Ibid., p. 28.

6 Ibid., p. 10.

7 Ibid., p. 20.

8 Ibid., p. 21; Gierke, , Johannes Althusius (Breslau, 1902), pp. 226227Google Scholar.

9 Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 7.

10 For which, cf. especially Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts and Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände. The chief part of these two works is translated as an appendix to Lewis, John D., The Genossenschaftstheorie of Otto von Gierke (University of Wisconsin Studies, 1935), pp. 139185Google Scholar.

11 Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 29–30, 67–68; ch. 10.

12 L'Individu et le Groupe dans la Scolastique du XIIIe Siècle,” in Revue Néo-Scolaslique de Philosophie, XXII (1920), 341357Google Scholar. This essay is repeated with little change in De Wulf, , Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages (Princeton, 1922), ch. 10CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

13 Ibid., p. 350.

14 Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 7.

15 Ibid., p. 10.

16 Ibid., p. 21.

17 Dante, , De Monarchia (Tutte le Opere, ed. Moore, E., Oxford, 1904, pp. 341376Google Scholar), bk. 1, ch. 3.

18 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 4.

19 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 5.

20 Cf. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, qs. 1–3; Gilson, Étienne, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1929), ch. 16Google Scholar.

21 Rosellinus, Antonius, Monarchia, s. de potestate imperatoris et papae (Goldast, Monarchia, vol. I, pp. 252556)Google Scholar, pt. 2, ch. 6. Maitland's translation erroneously gives this reference as pt. 1, ch. 6.

22 Nicholas of Cusa, De Concordantia Catholica (Bonn, 1928)Google Scholar, bk. 2, chs. 27–28.

23 Aquinas, , De Rebus Publicis et Principum Institutione [better known as De Regimine Principum] (Leyden, 1643), bk. 1, ch. 14Google Scholar.

24 This emphasis derived from the Stoic and patristic tradition, and was therefore common to most pre-scholastic writers and some later writers. Cf., e.g., Sylvius, Aeneas, De Ortu et Authoritate Imperii Romani (Goldast, vol. II, pp. 15581566), ch. 2Google Scholar.

25 Marsiglio of Padua, Defensor Pacis (ed. Prévité-Orton, C. W., Cambridge, 1928), bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 2Google Scholar.

26 Aquinas, , Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics (Opera, Parma, ed., vol. XXI)Google Scholar, bk. I, lectio 1; cf. also Romanus, Aegidius, De Regimine Principum (Rome, 1482)Google Scholar, bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 2; bk. 3, pt. 2, oh. 32; John of Paris, De Potestate Regia et Papali (Goldast, vol. II, pp. 108147), ch. 1Google Scholar.

27 Troeltsch, Ernst, The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches (tr. Wyon, O., New York, 1931), Vol. I, p. 299Google Scholar.

28 Aquinas, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, lectio 2.

29 Cf., e. g., Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 2; Occam, , Dialogus (Goldast, vol. II, pp. 393957)Google Scholar, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 2, ch. 6; Dante, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 5. An interesting example of the quantitative interpretation of the common good is found in Occam, who justifies the granting of privileges to individuals on the ground that, since a private person or particular college is a part of the whole community, “the good of any private person or particular college is the good of the whole community.” Op. cit., pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 2, ch. 27.

30 For an extreme statement of this commonplace idea, see Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 26. Cf. also the references in Political Theory of the Middle Age, n. 124.

31 This doctrine is less common, but equally consistent with medieval premises. For a vigorous statement, see Aeneas Sylvius, op. cit., chs. 17–18. Cf. also Dante, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 8.

32 Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 68.

33 Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 15.

34 Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, bk. 1, ch. 1. This statement is repeated in a not very clear condensation by John of Paris, op. cit., ch. 1.

35 This is very different from Gierke's statement (Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 31–32) that the ruler was needed to “represent” the unity which was the “essence” of the “social organism.” For further references, cf. John of Paris, op. cit., ch. 1; Engelbert of Admont, De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii (Basel, n. d.)Google Scholar, chs. 11, 12; Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, bk. 1, chs. 2, 5; Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 3; Antonius Rosellinus, op. cit., pt. 2, chs. 5–7; Pelagius, Alvarus, De Planctu Ecclesiae (Venice, 1560), bk. 1, ch. 62Google Scholar.

36 Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 17, sec. 2. Cf. also Occam, , Octo Quaestiones (Goldast, vol. II, pp. 314391)Google Scholar, q. 1, ch. 6; Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 2, ch. 25.

37 Cf. Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 4; Gerson, , De Potestate Ecclesiastica (Opera Omnia, ed. du Pin, Ellies, Antwerp, 1706, vol. II, pp. 114 ff.), consid. 13Google Scholar; Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q. 97, a. 1.

38 Aquinas, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, lectio 1. I owe this reference to De Wulf; Gierke also knew this passage, but seems to have missed its significance: v. Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 10 and n. 4.

39 Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 17, sec. 11. Gierke does not refer to this passage.

40 Political Theories of the Middle Age, n. 7.

41 Aquinas, , Commentary on Sentences of Peter Lombard (Opera, Parma, ed., vol. VII)Google Scholar, bk. 3, dist. 13, q. 2, a. 2, quaestiuncula 2. Gierke does not refer to this passage. Elsewhere, as Gierke points out (n. 81), Aquinas mentions other differences between the mystic and natural bodies: e. g., that the members of the mystic body do not all exist simultaneously (Summa Theologica, pt. 3, q. 8, a. 3).

42 But cf. Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 15, cited above.

43 Le plus ancien traité de l'église, Jacques de Viterbe, De Regimine Christiano (1301–1302), ed. Arquillière, H. X. (Paris, 1926), pt. 1, oh. 3Google Scholar. While this treatise was not widely circulated in the Middle Ages and is not included in Gierke's bibliography, the chapter in question here was reproduced almost verbatim in the widely-read De Planctu Ecclesiae of Alvarus Pelagius. Gierke cites Alvarus' work in other connections, but does not discuss this important chapter (bk. 1, ch. 63).

44 James of Viterbo, op. cit., pt. 2, ch. 5. That the papacy was necessary to the unity of the Church was, of course, a commonplace doctrine.

45 Ibid., pt. 1, ch. 3.

46 John of Turrecremata, Summa de Ecclesia contra Impugnatores Potestatis Summi Pontificis (Rome, 1489), bk. 1, ch. 6Google Scholar.

47 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 60.

48 Ibid., bk. 1, ch. 62.

49 Ibid., bk. 1, chs. 63, 65.

50 Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 71–72.

51 Turrecremata, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 71.

52 Except the anonymous argument which Turrecremata refutes in bk. 1, ch. 60, discussed above. There seems no reason to give this any particular weight. In view of Gierke's particular emphasis on Cusa as an “organic” thinker, I have given some pains to an examination of his theory of Concordantia. His thought is difficult to follow, but I find nothing in it inconsistent with the interpretation set forth above.

53 The argument here is based particularly on Aquinas' treatise on law: Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, qs. 90–97; v. in particular q. 94, as. 2, 4; q. 95, as. 2, 3.

54 Cf., e. g., Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 6; Occam, Dialogue, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 2, ch. 6.

55 Occam, loc. cit.

56 This idea reaches its highest development in Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 14, 33, and passim. In the anonymous continuation of Aquinas' De Regimine Principum, the concept of original freedom seems to lead to the conclusion that in certain communities, “fit for liberty,” the ruler should have no discretion and be a mere administrator of popularly-made laws (De Regimine Principum, bk. 2, chs. 8, 9; bk. 3, ch. 20; bk. 4, ch. 1). But this is exceptional.

57 De Wulf (op. cit., p. 348) speaks of natural rights in medieval theory, and cites Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia, IIae, q. 94, a. 2. But it is significant of the temper of Aquinas' thought that this list of the precepts of natural law is presented as a list of ends appropriate to the nature of man, and in its content is in sharp contrast with the natural rights of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought.

58 Cf., in particular, Aquinas, Summa Theologica, IIa, IIae, qs. 57, 66; Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 2, ch. 23; John of Paris, op. cit., ch, 7. Even the property right was subject to governmental regulation of business transactions, and might be superseded in an emergency by the common utility.

59 Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 12, sec. 5.

60 Troeltsch, op. cit., passim, esp. pp. 275–276.

61 Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 22.

62 Ibid., pp. 29–30.

63 Das Wesen der menschlichen Verbände, tr. Lewis, , op. cit., p. 153Google Scholar; cf. also Die Grundbegriffe des Staatsrechts, where Gierke contrasts his theory of the organ with “the private-law concept of the representative, trustee, or attorney” (Lewis, p. 185)Google Scholar.

64 Political Theories of the Middle Age, p. 28.

65 Ibid., ns. 92, 93.

66 Aquinas, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, lectio 1. Gierke's citation of this passage (Political Theories of the Middle Age, n. 4) omits the sentences just quoted.

67 It is important to notice that it is only at this point that there enters into medieval theory the notion of the part as “ordained to” the whole—of the individual as a means to the end of his group. This is true of the individual only in his official or functional capacity.

68 One source of this idea was the tradition that the authority of the Roman Emperor had been transferred to him by the Roman people; but the mediate rôle of the community could also be argued on purely theoretical grounds; cf., e. g., Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 15; Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 5, 15. The idea that power was mediated by the people might or might not issue in a preference for elective monarchy. On this whole subject, cf. Political Theories of the Middle Age, ch. 6, and the references given there; but v. infra, n. 70.

69 Aquinas, in De Regimine Principum, seems to illustrate this point of view. Cf. also his Summa contra Gentiles, pt. 3, q. 81. Aegidius Romanus, op. cit., bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 5, an argument for hereditary vs. elective monarchy, is an excellent example of the way in which such an argument could be carried out entirely in terms of expedience rather than of “rights.”

70 Cf. McIlwain, C. H., The Growth of Political Thought in the West (New York, 1932), chs. 6–7Google Scholar, passim, for analysis and illustration of this idea. Because the king, in McIlwain's phrase, was “absolute,” though not “arbitrary,” and because, as McIlwain points out (ibid., p. 390), legislative sovereignty was a concept impossible to medieval thought, Gierke's discussion of “The Idea of Popular Sovereignty” in the chapter cited supra, n. 68, seems to me open to grave objections.

71 Cf. Political Theories of the Middle Age, ns. 127–130, for references illustrating this position.

72 Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 34. Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 4, ch. 1, states the argument that the papal power rests on human ordination, but disposes of it in the following chapters. Marsiglio regarded all coercive jurisdiction of the pope as usurped (op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 4–7, 15–18). Gerson distinguished between the powers given the pope directly by God and those granted by man (op. cit., consid. 10).

73 Romanus, Aegidius, De Ecclesiastica Potestate (ed. Scholz, R., Weimar, 1929)Google Scholar, bk. 1, ch. 5; de Ancona, Augustinus, Summa de Ecclesiastica Potestate (Rome, 1479), q. 5Google Scholar; Alvarus Pelagius, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 6; Turrecremata, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 93 ff.

74 Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 6, ch. 84; Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 8, 13.

75 Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 3, chs. 4–13.

76 Cf. Political Theories of the Middle Age, n. 240.

77 De Wulf, op. cit., p. 355.

78 Cusa, op. cit., bk. 3, ch. 41.

79 Political Theories of the Middle Age, ch. 4.

80 Ibid., p. 28.

81 Cf. Aegidius Romanus, De Ecclesiastica Potestate; Turrecremata, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 54 ff.

82 Cf. n. 73 supra.

83 The most extreme statement is that of Aeneas Sylvius, op. cit., chs. 16 ff. Cf. Occam's statement and refutation of a similar position in Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 2, chs. 26–28.

84 Dante, op. cit., bk. 3; John of Paris, op. cit.; Occam's position is most conveniently summarized in De Imperatorum et Pontificum Potestate (ed. Brampton, C. K., Oxford, 1927)Google Scholar.

85 E.g., Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 24, secs. 12–13; Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 27–28; Gerson, op. cit., consid. 12.

86 E.g., Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 8; Gerson, op. cit., consids. 1, 11, and concl. 2; Gerson, , Sermo Factus XXI Die Julii, 1415 (Opera, vol. II, pp. 274 ff.)Google Scholar, pt. 3, directio 2; d'Ailly, Pierre, Tractatus de Ecclesiae, Concilii Generalis, Romani Pontificis, et Cardinalium Auctoritate (Gerson, Opera, vol. II, pp. 925 ff.)Google Scholar, pt. 3, ch. 1; pt. 4, ch. 3.

87 E.g., de Zabarellis, Franciscus, De Schismatibus Authoritate Imperatoris Tollendis (Schard, De Jurisdictione …, Basel, 1566, pp. 688 ff.)Google Scholar; Gerson, , De Unitate Ecclesiae (Opera, vol. II, pp. 114 ff.)Google Scholar, pt. 2, consids. 1, 2; Gerson, , De Auferibilitate Papae (Opera, vol. II, pp. 209 ff.)Google Scholar, consid. 10; Gerson, , Considerationes de Reformatione et Pace Ecclesiae (Opera, vol. II, pp. 69 ff.)Google Scholar, consids. 1, 2; Pierr e d'Ailly, op. cit., pt. 3, ch. 4.

88 Cf., esp., Gerson, Sermo Factus XXI Die Julii, 1415, pt. 3, directio 2; Pierre d'Ailly, op. cit., pt. 2, ch. 1. Cf. also Gierke's analyses of conciliar theories, in Political Theories of the Middle Age, esp. ns. 190, 196, 198, 203. These references, it seems to me, do not justify his assertion that the conciliarists believed in “a full sovereignty of the council” or “popular sovereignty within the Church” (ibid., pp. 54, 57).

89 In asserting (ibid., p. 45) that in these cases sovereignty belonged to the union of ruler and community, Gierke seems again to be reading a modern idea, not justified by his references (n. 165), into the medieval texts.

90 E.g., Richardi Armachani De Pauperie Salvatoris (Johannis Wycliffe De Dominio Divino, ed. Poole, R. L., London, 1890), bk. 1, ch. 2Google Scholar. On this whole subject of sovereignty and a hierarchy of dominia, cf. McIlwain, op. cit., chs. 6, 7, passim.

91 E.g., Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 14; Cusa, op. cit., bk. 3, ch. 32.

92 Of the references that Gierke lists in connection with medieval federalism (Political Theories of the Middle Age, ns. 62–64), two are in this category: Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, bk. 1, ch. 1; Aegidius Romanus, De Regimine Principum, bk. 2, pt. 1, ch. 2. I have not been able to secure Engelbert of Admont, De Regimine Principum, to which Gierke also refers. Cf. also Marsiglio, op. cit., bk. 1, ck. 3, and John of Paris, op. cit., ch. 1, to which Gierke does not refer.

93 Of Gierke's references, Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 5; Antonius Rosellinus, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 6; Augustinus de Ancona, op. cit., q. 1, a. 6, are in this category. Occam, Dialogue, pt. 3, tr. 1, bk. 2, chs. 3–5, is also an analysis of types of organization.

94 Engelbert of Admont, De Ortu et Fine Romani Imperii, chs. 7, 12, 15, 17, 18, cited by Gierke, falls in this class. Cf. also Aquinas, , Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle (Opera, Parma, ed., vol. XXI)Google Scholar, bk. 1, lectio 1; Aegidius Romanus, De Regimine Principum. bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 1.

95 Political Theories of the Middle Age, pp. 9–10, 20–21; Althusius, pp. 226–227.

96 Political Theories of the Middle Age, ns. 4, 62–64; the references in Althusius are the same.

97 Ibid., n. 4; discussed supra.

98 Cusa, op. cit., bk. 2, chs. 27–28; discussed supra.

99 Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, chs. 3, 5, 14.

100 Ibid., bk. 1, chs. 3–5. For similarly vague differentia, see Aquinas, Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 1, lectio 1; Aquinas, De Regimine Principum, bk. 1, ch. 1; Aegidius Romanus, De Regimine Principum, bk. 3, pt. 1, ch. 1; bk. 3, pt. 2, ch. 32. Engelbert of Admont, loc. cit., does not differentiate at all except quantitatively.

101 Dante, op. cit., bk. 1, ch. 14. Cf. similar statements in Antonius Rosellinus, op. cit., bk. 2, ch. 7; Engelbert of Admont, op. cit., ch. 18.

102 Cf. Occam, Dialogus, pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 1, chs. 1–13, for an exhaustive examination of the arguments in favor of world-monarchy.

103 Ibid., pt. 3, tr. 2, bk. 1, chs. 6, 7.

104 John of Paris, op. cit., ch. 3. Cf. Gerson, De Potestate Ecclesiastica, consid. 9.