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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 November 2014
In contrast to the numerous expositions and commentaries concerning the origin, history, and nature of the doctrine of the separation of powers, early theories of parliamentary government have failed to attract the attention of historians of political thought. This negligence arises from two factors which must not be under-estimated. In the first place, it is generally asserted that Walter Bagehot was the first to appreciate the true nature of parliamentarism. Indeed, the penetration and lucidity of his famous essay on the English constitution overshadowed earlier attempts to grasp theoretically the mechanism of parliamentary government. In the second place, historians of political theory have been less prone to trace the roots of the theory of parliamentarism than those of the doctrine of the separation of powers because parliamentary government, although gradually introduced into a number of countries in the course of the nineteenth century, was not reduced to writing in any organic law prior to the World War. The development of the theory of parliamentary government is, therefore, one of the most neglected chapters in the history of constitutional ideas.
While the English to the end of the fifties of the last century looked upon and appraised their constitution through the eyes of Montesquieu, Blackstone, and De Lolme, continental theorists were busy in elaborating a new theory about the nature of the English constitution. The early history of parliamentary theory is determined, therefore, to no small extent by the way in which continental theorists observed and conceived the operation of English government. It was in France and Germany that the true nature of the English constitution was first discovered and a theory of parliamentarism formulated for the direct purpose of introducing the parliamentary system into those two countries.
1 See, e.g., Dicey, A. V., The Law of the Constitution (ed. 4, London, 1893), p. 19 Google Scholar; Esmein, A., Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé (ed. 8, Paris, 1927), vol. I, p. 171.Google Scholar
2 Constant's political writings are collected in Collection complète des ouvrages publiés sur le gouvernement représentatif et la constitution actuelle de la France formant une espèce des cours de politique constitutionnelle (Paris, 1818–1819), 4 vols.Google Scholar A second edition was arranged by Pagés de l'Arriège, in two volumes in 1836. Laboulaye published a new edition in two volumes in 1861, of which a second edition appeared in 1872. The most easily available edition of Constant's writings, which in a sufficiently complete and systematic manner contains the major points of his political theory, was arranged by Louandre, Ch. under the title of Œuvres politiques de Benjamin Constant (Paris, 1874).Google Scholar The latter edition has been used in this study.
3 Hasbach, W., Die parlamentarische Kabinettsregierung (Stuttgart und Berlin, 1919), p. 211 Google Scholar: “Zum vollen Verständnis dieser Periode muss man Benjamin Constant lesen, der für die Lehre von der parlamentarischen Regierung gewesen ist, was Montesquieu für den Grundsatz der Gewaltentrennung war.” See Jellinek, G., Allgemeine Staatslehre (ed. 2, Berlin, 1905), p. 338 Google Scholar, note 1, who has pointed out that constitutional or parliamentary practices in continental countries often have their sources neither in English nor in French experience, but in the theories of Bentham and Constant.
4 See de Hauranne, Duvergier, Histoire du gouvernement parlementaire en France, 1814-1848 (Paris, 1859), vol. I, p. xiii Google Scholar; Deslandres, M., Histoire constitutionnelle de la France de 1789 à 1870 (Paris, 1932), vol. I, pp. 666, 680, 683–4Google Scholar; Esmein, , Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé, vol. I, p. 243.Google Scholar The best study on the emergence of parliamentary government in France is J. Barthélemy, , L'Introduction du régime parlementaire en France sous Louis XVIII et Charles x (Paris, 1910).Google Scholar
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11 Louandre, Œuvres politiques de Benjamin Constant, part I, chap. II: “Du pouvoir royal dans les monarchies constitutionnelles.” See Redslob's, definition of the monarch (Le Régime parlementaire, p. 5)Google Scholar: “Nous pouvons dire, en une formule brève, qu'il est la force génératrice du mécanisme. En effet, il donne l'impulsion au rouage savant, qui fait jouer la volonté nationale par l'intermédiaire des ministres et du parlement.”
12 In this connection it must be remembered that “impeachment,” which today is associated with the notion of legal action against public servants primarily in cases of malfeasance, was freely employed in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century England against ministers whose political activities displeased Parliament.
13 These are the words of Lord Broughton (John Hobhouse), as quoted by Schermerhorn, E. W., Benjamin Constant (London, 1924), p. 379.Google Scholar The attention which the essay on responsibility attracted may be seen from the fact that it was immediately translated into English and that it was published in the May issue of the Pamphleteer: Respectfully Dedicated to Both Houses of Parliament (London, 1815), no. x.Google Scholar
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26 Ibid. : “toute loi émane donc de lui ; il est donc souverain législateur.”
27 Ibid., p. 282.
28 Ibid., p. 271.
29 Ibid., p. 288.
30 Ibid., p. 300.
31 Ibid., pp. 278-81.
32 Ibid.
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34 Œuvres complètes, vol. XXVI, pp. 318–19.Google Scholar
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37 de Broglie, A. C. L., Vues sur le gouvernement de la France (Paris, 1870), pp. xxxii, xli-ii, lxiv, lxx Google Scholar; pp. 225-45, 247-71. Chapter vi, “Du Prince,” openly betrays the influence of Constant.
38 Prévost-Paradol, , La France nouvelle (ed. 14, Paris, 1905), pp. 123–6.Google Scholar The first edition appeared in 1868.
39 See Esmein, , Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé, vol. II, pp. 27–8Google Scholar: “nous aurons l'occasion de constater maintes fois, chemin faisant, la concordance qui existe entre les solutions adoptées par les lois constitutionnelles de 1875 et celles proposées dans les Vues sur le gouvernment de la France ou dans la France Nouvelle.” Barthélemy, J., Le Rôle du pouvoir exécutif dans les républiques modernes (Paris, 1906), p. 680 Google Scholar, speaks of “les deux auteurs dont les idées ont inspiré les constituants de 1875.”
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47 See Linnenkohl, E., Dahlmann und der Konstitutionalismus (Kiel, 1913).Google Scholar
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54 Mohl, R., “Über die verschiedene Auffassung des repräsentativen Systemes in England, Frankreich und Deutschland” (Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft, vol. VI, 1846, pp. 451–95)Google Scholar; partly reprinted in Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik (Tübingen, 1860), vol. I, pp. 35–65.Google Scholar
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58 Mohl, R., “Das Repräsentativsystem, seine Mangel und die Heilmittel” (Deutsche Vierteljahrschrift, 1852, pp. 145 ff.Google Scholar; reprinted in Staatsrecht, Völkerrecht und Politik, Tübingen, 1860, vol. I, pp. 367–458).Google Scholar
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61 Jellinek, G., “Bundesstaat und parlamentarische Regierung” (in Ausgewählte Schriften und Reden, Berlin, 1911, vol. II, p. 439).Google Scholar See Treitschke, H. v., “Das konstitutionelle Königthum in Deutschland” (in Historische und politische Aufsätze, ed. 5, Leipzig, 1886, vol. III, pp. 429–561).Google Scholar
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63 For a short summary, see Keir, D. L., The Constitutional History of Modern Britain, 1485-1937 (London, 1938), pp. 365–455.Google Scholar Todd, On Parliamentary Government in England, chap, iv, containing the annals of the administrations between 1782 and 1873, is the best account available of the development of parliamentarism during this period.
64 Disraeli, B., “Vindication of the English Constitution” (in Hutcheon, W., ed., Whigs and Whiggism, Political Writings by Benjamin Disraeli, London, 1913, p. 113).Google Scholar This essay, strongly anti-utilitarian and pro-Tory even in its historical analysis, was written in the form of a “letter to a noble and learned Lord” (Lord Lyndhurst).
65 Ibid., p. 228.
66 Russell, J., An Essay on the History of the English Government and Constitution (London, 1865), p. 95.Google Scholar This essay, first published in 1820, went through many editions and printings. A retrospect for the period from 1820 to 1864 is added as a concluding chapter to the edition here used.
67 Ibid., p. 89.
68 Bentham, however, severely criticized the theory of the separation of powers as inapplicable to the English constitution. See his A Fragment on Government (Oxford edition of 1891), pp. 182–99.Google Scholar
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73 Grey, Earl, Parliamentary Government Considered with Reference to a Reform of Parliament (London, 1858).Google Scholar The second edition, published in 1864, was reviewed at great length in Germany by Norden, C. v., “Die parlamentarische Parteiregierung in England” (Historische Zeitschrift, vol. XIV, 1865, pp. 45–111).Google Scholar
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75 Ibid.
76 Lerner, M., “Walter Bagehot: A Credible Victorian” (in Ideas Are Weapons, New York, 1939, pp. 310–11)Google Scholar, writes: “Bagehot's English Constitution (1867) is probably his most widely read book …. His exposition of the theory of Cabinet government, of the survival value of such institutions as an English monarchy and the House of Lords, and of the function of the House of Commons as an organ of administrative control, has been formative for all subsequent discussions. When anyone sets out today to write a realistic analysis of the English Constitution, like as not he has Bagehot in mind as his archetype. In fact the book has achieved so complete an acceptance as representing the reality of English government that it has doubtless influenced the shape that political institutions tended to take.”
77 Brinton, C., English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century (London, 1933), p. 194 Google Scholar: “His analysis of the practical differences between the cabinet and the congressional system is penetrating and has hardly been improved on since.”
78 Bagehot, W., The English Constitution (latest rev. ed., New York, 1907), pp. 70–1.Google Scholar The various chapters of the book first appeared in the Fortnightly Review between the spring of 1865 and January, 1867. A German translation appeared in 1868, a French translation in 1869.
79 Ibid., p. 78.
80 Ibid., p. 79. “A cabinet is a combining committee—a hyphen which joins, a buckle which fastens, the legislative part of the state to the executive part of the state. In its origin it belongs to the one, in its functions it belongs to the other” (ibid., p. 82).
81 Ibid., p. 83. Bagehot continues: “Either the cabinet legislates and acts, or else it can dissolve. It is a creature, but it has the power of destroying its creators. It is an executive which can annihilate the legislature, as well as an executive which is the nominee of the legislature.”
82 See, e.g., Dicey's, A. V. concise essay on “Distinction between a Parliamentary Executive and a Non-Parliamentary Executive” (in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. 4, London, 1893, pp. 411–20).Google Scholar
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