Concubinage or Marriage? Informal and Formal Cooperations for Innovation

32 Pages Posted: 15 May 2004 Last revised: 18 Dec 2013

See all articles by Werner Bönte

Werner Bönte

Max Planck Institute of Economics

Max Keilbach

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

Based on a sample of German inno innovating vating firms that contains information on formal and informal innovation cooperation between customers and suppliers, we state that firms perceive informal cooperation as being more important than formal cooperation modes. We then investigate the determinants of firms' decisions to engage into the respective espective cooperation modes. In line with previous empirical work, we do not find much empirical evidence for the relevance of incoming spillovers. In addition, our results suggest that this finding holds as well for informal cooperations. A firm's ability to protect its proprietary innovations, however, seems to be a key determinant of formal as well as informal cooperations. Furthermore absorptive capacity and the organizational structur of in-house R&D play an important role. Another relevant driver of vertical cooperations are the innovation dynamics at the industry level. Firms who operate an R&D department and firms who are involved in costly R&D projects tend to cooperate formally rather than informally.

Keywords: R&D Cooperation, Spillovers, lovers, Appropriability, Innovation

JEL Classification: D21, L13, O31, O32

Suggested Citation

Bönte, Werner and Keilbach, Max, Concubinage or Marriage? Informal and Formal Cooperations for Innovation (2004). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 04-011, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=546102 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.546102

Werner Bönte (Contact Author)

Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Straße 10
Jena, D-07745
Germany

Max Keilbach

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
+49 - 3641 - 68 67 70 (Phone)
+49 - 3641 - 68 67 10 (Fax)

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