Signaling, Learning, and Screening Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of Preliminary Injunctions

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2012) doi: 10.1093/jleo/ews015

49 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2009 Last revised: 25 Jul 2012

See all articles by Thomas D. Jeitschko

Thomas D. Jeitschko

Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Byung-Cheol Kim

University of Alabama

Date Written: February 25, 2012

Abstract

Preliminary injunctions (PIs) are important in litigation in many settings, including antitrust, copyright, patent, trademark, employment and labor relations, and contracts. The filing of a PI and the court's ruling generate information that can impact settlement. We find that some plaintiffs request a PI to signal bounds on their damages in order to elicit better settlement offers. As a result, the parties are more likely to come to an out-of-court agreement permitting the disputed activity, compared to when a PI is motivated solely by defensive reasons to avert immediate damages during trial. Although the grant of a PI reduces ex post incentives for potential litigants to settle, this is more than offset by an increase in settlement upon a denial. Thus, ex ante, learning leads to more settlement. Nevertheless, the anticipation of learning and increased chances of settlement do not affect the initial filing decision.

Keywords: preliminary injunction, learning, signaling, screening, litigation, settlement

JEL Classification: D8, J53, K21, K41, K42, L2

Suggested Citation

Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Kim, Byung-Cheol, Signaling, Learning, and Screening Prior to Trial: Informational Implications of Preliminary Injunctions (February 25, 2012). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization (2012) doi: 10.1093/jleo/ews015 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1414316 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1414316

Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)

Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )

110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/

Byung-Cheol Kim

University of Alabama ( email )

Culverhouse College of Business
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487-0223
United States
7708462727 (Phone)
7708462727 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://bkim.people.ua.edu/

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