Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate

74 Pages Posted: 21 Dec 2007 Last revised: 19 Mar 2009

See all articles by Stephen J. Choi

Stephen J. Choi

New York University School of Law

Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: December 2007

Abstract

Nearly everyone thinks that judges are underpaid, but theory and evidence provide little support for this view. Theory suggests that increasing judicial salaries will improve judicial performance only if judges can be sanctioned for performing inadequately or if the appointments process reliably screens out low-ability candidates. However, federal judges and many state judges cannot be sanctioned, and the reliability of screening processes is open to question. An empirical study of the high court judges of the 50 states provides little evidence that raising salaries would improve judicial performance. The case for a pay raise has not been made.

Suggested Citation

Choi, Stephen J. and Gulati, Mitu and Posner, Eric A., Are Judges Overpaid?: A Skeptical Response to the Judicial Salary Debate (December 2007). U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 376, Duke Law School Legal Studies Paper No. 178, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1077295 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1077295

Stephen J. Choi (Contact Author)

New York University School of Law ( email )

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Mitu Gulati

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

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Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-e/

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