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Charging game analysis considering non-ideal behavior of electric vehicle aggregationsChinese Full TextEnglish Full Text (MT)

Zhang Zhonghui;Liu Xiaowan;Yang Qi;School of Information Engineering,Nanchang University;

Abstract: Considering the subjective and non-ideal behavior of electric vehicle aggregations,the aggregations coordinate the charging of electric vehicles and conduct the research on charging competition. With the goal of minimizing costs,each aggregation considers the behavior of neighboring aggregations and determines its own charging strategy,including the time of charging and the amount of charging. The competition between aggregations is simulated by establishing a twostage non-cooperative game model. Based on the subjective evaluation of the behavior of opponents,the expected utility theory and prospect theory are used to study the influence of charging strategy of aggregations on game results. The result shows that when the ideal or non-ideal behavior of an aggregation plays a game role,a perfect ε-Nash equilibrium is formed,and a coordinated electric vehicle charging strategy can have a significant effect in terms of energy cost saving and peak-to-average ratio reduction.
  • DOI:

    10.19753/j.issn1001-1390.2019.014.012

  • Series:

    (C) Architecture/ Energy/ Traffic/ Electromechanics, etc

  • Subject:

    Electric Power Industry

  • Classification Code:

    TM73

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