2009년 미국 연방제2순회항소법원은, 컴퓨터 해킹을 통해 알아낸 미공개중요정보를 거래에 이용한 사건에 대한, SEC v. Dorozhko 판결에서 “적극적 부실표시 이론”을 처음으로 채택하였다. 즉, 1934년 증권거래소법 section 10(b)의 “deceptive device”에 해당하기 위한 요건으로서, 연방대법원이 信任義務理論과 不正流用理論을 채택해 오면서 요구한, “신임의무위반”을 배제하고, 컴퓨터 해킹을 통한 정보획득이 적극적 부실표시(affirmative misrepresentation)를 사용한 별개의 “deceptive device”에 해당한다고 판시함으로써 큰 파문을 일으키고 있다. 이 논문은 “적극적 부실표시 이론”을 처음으로 채택한 Dorozhko판결의 내용을 설명하고, 미국에서의 情報所有理論, 信任義務理論, 不正流用理論 등 내부자거래규제 법리의 전개내용과 거기에서 차지하는 Dorozhko 판결의 의미와 시사점을 다루었다. 그리고 Dorozhko 판결이 한국의 내부자거래규제에 던져주는 시사점을 분석하고 논술하였다. 득히, 우리나라가 Dorozhko case의 행위유형을 규제하는 데에 있어서, 적합한 내부자거래규제법리가 도입되어있지도 않다는 점과 내부자거래규제에 관한 자본시장법 규정도 미흡하다는 점을 지적하면서, 조속한 시일 내에 자본시장법 제174조의 개정을 통한 입법적 해결이 요망된다는 점을 논하였다.
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in SEC v. Dorozhko (hereinafter, Dorozhko), in which Dorozhko traded put options on the basis of the material nonpublic information acquired by his conduct of computer hacking, adopted the “affirmative misrepresentation theory” for the first time in regulating insider trading in the United States. The 2nd Circuit in Dorozhko held that a “breach of fiduciary duty”, which the U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella, O'Hagan and Zanford required as a requirement of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b) violation, was not required for the defendant's conduct of computer hacking to be “deceptive device” in the language of section 10(b). Instead, the 2nd Circuit in Dorozhko held that the defendant's conduct of computer hacking which employed affirmative misrepresentation to gain access to the computer server could be a “deceptive device” prohibited by section 10(b), stating that an affirmative misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud under section 10(b). This article deals with the 2nd Circuit's decision in Dorozhko as follows: First, this article describes the facts of Dorozhko and explains the holdings of Dorozhko. Second, this article examines the evolution of major theories on insider trading regulation in the United States and reviews the meaning and implications of Dorozhko in insider trading regulation in the United States. Third, this article analyzes the issue of whether Korea's Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act provisions on insider trading prohibition have adopted the fiduciary duty theory or the misappropriation theory of the United States and then discusses Dorozhko's implications in regulating insider trading in Korea.
In 2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit in SEC v. Dorozhko (hereinafter, Dorozhko), in which Dorozhko traded put options on the basis of the material nonpublic information acquired by his conduct of computer hacking, adopted the “affirmative misrepresentation theory” for the first time in regulating insider trading in the United States. The 2nd Circuit in Dorozhko held that a “breach of fiduciary duty”, which the U.S. Supreme Court in Chiarella, O'Hagan and Zanford required as a requirement of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 10(b) violation, was not required for the defendant's conduct of computer hacking to be “deceptive device” in the language of section 10(b). Instead, the 2nd Circuit in Dorozhko held that the defendant's conduct of computer hacking which employed affirmative misrepresentation to gain access to the computer server could be a “deceptive device” prohibited by section 10(b), stating that an affirmative misrepresentation is a distinct species of fraud under section 10(b). This article deals with the 2nd Circuit's decision in Dorozhko as follows: First, this article describes the facts of Dorozhko and explains the holdings of Dorozhko. Second, this article examines the evolution of major theories on insider trading regulation in the United States and reviews the meaning and implications of Dorozhko in insider trading regulation in the United States. Third, this article analyzes the issue of whether Korea's Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act provisions on insider trading prohibition have adopted the fiduciary duty theory or the misappropriation theory of the United States and then discusses Dorozhko's implications in regulating insider trading in Korea.
