In the Civil law system, the extinctive prescription is formulated to promote legal efficiency. It prevents stale claims as well as encourages the resolution of legal claims within a reasonable time period. The general view has it that the prescription period of 10 years set out in paragraph 2, Art. 766 of the Korean Civil Code is perceived as a means to limiting(restricting?) the extension of the prescription period by 3 years set out in paragraph 1 for further observative purpose.
Therefore, the 10 year term of exercise period in all respects functions only when considering the purpose of the 3 year limitation term stipulated in the preceding paragraph and it does not carry raison d´être on its own. In correspondence to the suspensibility and instability of the 3 year limitation term, interpretation and usage of this 10 year clause should be standardized yet remain absolute. An extension period results from interruption, suspension, and delayed commencement of the prescription, as well as the pleading based on the good faith doctrine, will not be allowed.
This theory(view) is very consistent as an ideological claim, however it does not coincide with the substantive enactment prescribed in Art. 766 of the Civil Code. Therein lies the problem. Problematic issues arise when it comes to real-world implementation or in consideration of the results.
Further in-depth theoretical consideration should be applied in regards to whether the 10 year term carries raison d´être on its own; if it does, what is its connection with the 3 year term; also, if the running of 10 year term prescription is interrupted, what would interruption mean under such circumstances; how should one interpret the significance of the comprehensive Art. 766, and so forth. At the very least, the interpretation of exercise period prescribed in paragraph 2 of Art. 766 as extinctive prescription, will sufficiently reflect the legislative history and legal terminology of our legal system. It will also be more reasonable from the dimension of comparative law.
Futhermore, the Supreme Court's recent decisions on tort claims concerning unlawful acts of state, product liability, pharmaceutical product possessing an incubation period etc., show that the Court has adopted a more flexible approach in dealing with the commencement point of the prescription or pleading based on the good faith doctrine, with focus to protect the rights of the injured party. Taking that on board, the clause should no longer be interpreted in the conventional manner that attempts to promote legal efficiency in favour of protecting the so-called general public interest, and neither should it be imposed upon the injured party.
In short, the general view that perceives the long-term period for exercise of a right as an exclusion period purporting to promote legal efficiency from the dimension of generating general public interest is nothing more than a "creative interpretation that differs from the substantive enactment" which lacks of objective rationality and appropriateness of the results.