초록

최근 국제개발원조가 경제발전이나 수원국 국민들의 건강증진과 같은 실제적인 효과로 이어지는가에 대한 문제의식이 제기되면서, 원조의 효과성에 영향을 미칠 수 있는 요인들에 대한 관심으로 이어졌고, 그러한 요인 중의 하나로 거버넌스가 주목을 받게 되었다. 그러나 국제개발원조에서의 거버넌스에 대한 논의들은 대부분 수원국 정부 내에서의 거버넌스에만초점이 맞추어져 있고, 관여하는 모든 주체들의 관계와 이들을 지배하는 거버넌스에 대한 고찰은 아직 많지 않다. 본 연구에서는 공여국 내, 공여국‒수원국 간, 수원국 내에 형성되는 주체들(actors) 간의 관계를 주인‒대리인(principal‒agent) 모형을 적용하여 살펴보고, 각 단계에서 주인‒대리인 문제를해결하기 위한 유인기전(incentive mechanism)들의 장단점들과 그에 대한 대안을 살펴보았다. 국제개발 원조에서는 업무의 위임 혹은 협력이 여러 단계로 발생하고, 이들 간에는 정보의 비대칭과 선호도의 차이가 나타나서 주인‒대리인 관계가 성립되면서 주인‒대리인 문제 또한 각 단계마다 발생함을 볼 수 있었다. 공여국의 국민들은 실질적으로 원조에 대한 인식․정보의 부족으로 주인의 역할을 거의 하지 못하고 있어 원조의 투명성 확보가 시급하다. 한편, 최근 성과를 기반으로 한 조건부 원조나 성과 보상 피드백 연결고리의 단절로 나타나는문제점들이 인식되기 시작하면서 수원국의 주인의식(ownership)을 높여주는 대안들이 강조되고 있다. 국제개발원조에서 이러한 새로운 접근법들의 출현으로 고전적인 주인‒대리인 모델에 대한 새로운 시각과 인식전환이 필요할 것이다.

키워드

국제개발원조, 거버넌스, 주인‒대리인, 조건부 원조, 주인의식

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