이 글은 비거주자․외국법인이 받는 이자소득 과세에 대한 국내법과 조세조약의 해석론을 제시하고 문제점을 분석한다. 이자소득의 과세에서 가장 문제가 되는 것은 이른바 지점이자세, 곧 외국법인의 국내지점이 지급하거나 손금산입하는 이자이다. 지점이자세는 조세조약의 이자소득을 지급하는 자의 거주지국(H국), 지점 소재지국(B국), 이자를 지급받는 자의 거주지국(R국)의 과세권이 서로 얽히는 복잡한 문제를 낳는다.
이 글 Ⅰ.과 Ⅱ.는 논점의 제기와 법령 및 조약 규정의 개관이다. Ⅲ.은 국내법 해석론으로 특히 채권의 전전유통시 보유기간별 이자상당액에 대해 원천징수의무를 지우는 국내법 조문의 해석상 문제점을 지적한다. Ⅳ. 1.～3.의 내용은 조세조약이 이자소득 과세에 어떤 제약을 가하는지 분석하기 위한 전초로, 조약상 이자소득의 범위, 이자소득의 원천판정 및 실수익자 개념에 대한 법해석론을 담고 있다. 이 분석을 바탕으로 4.는 지점이자세에 대한 조약상의 이자소득 관련 제한을 차별금지조항과 추적과세 금지조항 중심으로 살핀다. 5.는 H국, B국, R국 사이의 삼면관계를 분석한다. OECD 모델을 따르는 전형적인 조약의 이자소득 조항에서는 지점이 직접 사용한 차입금에 따르는 이자이든 초과이자(지점에 할당되는 국외이자)이든 모두 B-R 조약의 적용범위에 들어간다. 미국의 해석론에서는 초과이자는 B-H 조약의 적용을 받고 B-R 조약은 적용받지 않는다고 하나 이는 미국 국내법의 특별규정에 따르는 법률효과일 뿐이다. 한결 일반화해서 본다면 지점이자세가 낳는 3면관계에서는 B국, H국, R국 사이에서 이중 또는 삼중과세의 가능성이 있고, 최종 결과는 구체적인 조약의 글귀에 따라 달라진다.
The paper analyzes Korean domestic law and tax treaty provisions regarding taxation of interest income derived by non-residents and foreign corporations, and proffers a few problems and solutions in interpreting the provisions. The most difficult issue regarding interest income is the branch interest, i.e., interest paid by or otherwise deducted by a domestic branch of a foreign corporation. The issue involves the trilateral overlap of taxation by the home country(H) of the interest payor, the country(B) where the branch exists and the country(R) where the payee is resident. Chapters Ⅰ and Ⅱ are introduction, presenting the overall domestic law and treaty provisions and the apparent issues. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes Korean domestic law, and points out inter alia that the statutory language of obligating the buyer or issuer of bonds to withhold tax commensurately with the holding period of the seller has been mis-drafted. Chapter Ⅳ addresses tax treaties. Sections 1 to 3 analyzes the preliminary issues of the scope of interest income, treaty source rule, and the beneficial owner of interest income. Section 4 is about two specific issues of non-discrimination and prohibition of extra-territorial application of withholding taxes. Section 5 analyzes the main topic of the trilateral relation among the three countries of H, B, and R. Under a typical interest provision based on the OECD Model, the branch interest, either paid by the branch or otherwise deducted, is always governed by the B-R treaty. The U.S. interpretation that the B-H treaty but not the B-R treaty applies only results from a particular provision of U.S. domestic law and is not supportable in a jurisdiction absent a similar statutory provision. In general, the trilateral nature of the branch interest may result in a double or even triple taxation, depending on the specific language of the concerned treaties.
The paper analyzes Korean domestic law and tax treaty provisions regarding taxation of interest income derived by non-residents and foreign corporations, and proffers a few problems and solutions in interpreting the provisions. The most difficult issue regarding interest income is the branch interest, i.e., interest paid by or otherwise deducted by a domestic branch of a foreign corporation. The issue involves the trilateral overlap of taxation by the home country(H) of the interest payor, the country(B) where the branch exists and the country(R) where the payee is resident. Chapters Ⅰ and Ⅱ are introduction, presenting the overall domestic law and treaty provisions and the apparent issues. Chapter Ⅲ analyzes Korean domestic law, and points out inter alia that the statutory language of obligating the buyer or issuer of bonds to withhold tax commensurately with the holding period of the seller has been mis-drafted. Chapter Ⅳ addresses tax treaties. Sections 1 to 3 analyzes the preliminary issues of the scope of interest income, treaty source rule, and the beneficial owner of interest income. Section 4 is about two specific issues of non-discrimination and prohibition of extra-territorial application of withholding taxes. Section 5 analyzes the main topic of the trilateral relation among the three countries of H, B, and R. Under a typical interest provision based on the OECD Model, the branch interest, either paid by the branch or otherwise deducted, is always governed by the B-R treaty. The U.S. interpretation that the B-H treaty but not the B-R treaty applies only results from a particular provision of U.S. domestic law and is not supportable in a jurisdiction absent a similar statutory provision. In general, the trilateral nature of the branch interest may result in a double or even triple taxation, depending on the specific language of the concerned treaties.
