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NÜKLEER SİLAHLARIN YAYILMASINI ÖNLEME ANTLAŞMASI’NIN OLUŞUMU: ULUSLARARASI REJİM TEORİLERİ ÜZERİNDEN BİR ANALİZ

Year 2022, Volume: 17 Issue: 57, 447 - 467, 30.01.2022

Kahraman Süvari Çiğdem Nas

https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.929259

Abstract

Bu çalışma, nükleer silahların yayılmasını engellemek için oluşturulan uluslararası rejimin temel mekanizması olan Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme (NSYÖ) Antlaşması’nın ortaya çıkışını etkileyen faktörleri, rejim teorilerinin temel varsayımları üzerinden incelemektedir. Çalışmada, NSYÖ Antlaşması’nın oluşturulmasında hangi faktörler rol oynamıştır sorusuna yanıt aranacaktır. Bu çalışmanın araştırma yöntemi, teorik varsayımların vaka çalışması ile test edilmesidir. Bu çerçevede, çalışmada kullanılacak olan rejim teorileri, özellikle devletlerin uluslararası sistemde belirli alanlarda neden işbirliği yaptıkları ile ilgilenir. Bu teorilerde rejimlerin oluşumuna etki eden faktörlere göre üç farklı yaklaşımdan söz edilmektedir: güç-odaklı, bilişselodaklı ve çıkar-odaklı yaklaşımlar. NSYÖ Antlaşması iki katmanlı bir yapıya sahip gibi görünse de, antlaşmaya taraf olan tüm aktörler bu işbirliğinden fayda sağlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada NSYÖ Antlaşması’nın ortaya çıkması konusunda çıkar odaklı yaklaşımların varsayımlarının diğerlerine göre daha açıklayıcı oldukları iddia edilmektedir.

Keywords

Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasını Önleme Antlaşması uluslararası rejimler işbirliği nükleer silahsızlanma

References

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  • Athanasopulos, H. (2000). Nuclear Disarmament in International Law. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Company.
  • Bajia, D. S. (1997). The Concept of Nuclear Proliferation: Need For Reconsideration. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 10(1), 47–50.
  • Basics of IAEA Safeguards. Retrieved August 3, 2021, from IAEA website: https://www.iaea.org/topics/basics-of-iaea-safeguards
  • Bellany, I. (1977). Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Inequality of States. Political Studies, 25(4), 594–598.
  • Bunn, G. (2003, December). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems. Retrieved from Arms Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn
  • Burns, E. L. M. (1969). The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects. International Organization, 23(4), 788–807.
  • Carlson, J., Kuchinov, V., & Shea, T. (2020, May 11). The IAEA’s Safeguards System as the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Verification Mechanism. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved from https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_Paper_Safeguards_FINAL_5-8-20.pdf
  • China’s First Nuclear Test 1964—50th Anniversary. (2014, October 16). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from The National Security Archive website: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/
  • Cottrell, M. P. (2016). The Evolution and Legitimacy of International Security Institutions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
  • Davenport, K. (2019). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. San Rafael,CA: Morgan & Claypool Publishers.
  • Davis, Z. S. (1993). The Realist Nuclear Regime. Security Studies, 2(3–4), 79–99.
  • Declassified Paper of The Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee. (1965, January 14). Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/selected_key_documents_from_uk_state_papers_1965.pdf
  • Establishment of A Commission to Deal With The Problem Raised By The Discovery of Atomic Energy. (1946, January 24). Retrieved from General Assembly Resolutions Adopted By the General Assembly During Its First Session website: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm
  • Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards. (2014, July 25). Retrieved May 10, 2021, from IAEA website: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards
  • Fischer, D. (1998). The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
  • Gehring, T. (1994). Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Governance. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
  • Goldberg, A. (1964). The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent. International Affairs, 40(3), 409–429.
  • Haas, E. B. (1990). When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Haggard, S., & Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of International Regimes. International Organization, 41(3), 491–517.
  • Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Hirsch, T. (2004). The IAEA Additional Protocol What It is and Why It Matters. Nonproliferation Review, (140–166).
  • Hoffman, A. M. (2002). A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 8(3), 375–401.
  • Jervis, R. (1982). Security Regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 357–378.
  • Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63.
  • Jönsson, C. (1995). Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics. In V. Rittberger (Ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (pp. 202–222). Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
  • Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
  • Keohane, R. O. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly, 32(4), 379–396.
  • Khlopkov, A. V. (2017, September). Roland Timerbaev: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Has Largely Achieved Its Goals | Arms Control Association. Retrieved April 14, 2020, from Arms Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/interviews/roland-timerbaev-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-largely-achieved-its-goals
  • Knopf, J. W. (2012). Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses. In Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (pp. 13–38). Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies.
  • Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205.
  • Krass, A. S., Boskma, P., Elzen, B., & Smit, W. A. (1983). Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. London: SIPRI (Taylor & Francis Ltd).
  • Krause, J. (2007). Enlightenment and Nuclear Order. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 83(3), 483–499.
  • Lynch, A. (1991). The Soviet Union: Nuclear weapons and their role in security policy. In R. C. Karp (Ed.), Security with Nuclear Weapons?: Different Perspectives on National Security (pp. 100–124). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Lynch, C. (2010, April 30). The nuclear caste system. Retrieved February 10, 2021, from Foreign Policy website: https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/30/the-nuclear-caste-system/
  • Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5–49.
  • Miller, N. L. (2014). Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy? Security Studies, 23(1), 33–73.
  • Milner, H. (1992). International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses. World Politics, 44(3), 466–496.
  • Müller, H. (2017). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics. The International Spectator, 52(1), 12–27.
  • Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization, 44(4), 479–526.
  • Nayar, B. R. (1995). Regimes, Power, and International Aviation. International Organization, 49(1), 139–170.
  • Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Ninetieth Congress Second Session on Executive H, 90th Congress, Second Session, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1968). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
  • Nye, J. S. (1985). NPT: The Logic of Inequality. Foreign Policy, (59), 123–131.
  • Paul, T. V. (2003). Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(1), 135–154.
  • Powaski, R. E. (1989). March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1665(XVI)). (1962). Retrieved April 14, 2020, from United Nations Digital Library website: http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/204596
  • Radchenko, S. (Trans.). (1968, April 9). Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI: fond 2, opis 3, delo 95, listy 35-44. Retrieved from https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177818
  • Rauf, T. (2017). Fiftieth Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for a Successful Outcome Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Asia Pacific Leadership Network Policy Briefs, (48).
  • Reiss, M. (1988). Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Rossin, D. A. (2001). Secrecy and Misguided Policy. The Center for International Security and Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/33/048/33048040.pdf
  • Rublee, M. R. (2008). Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 10(3), 420–450.
  • Ruzicka, J., & Wheeler, N. J. (2010). The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 86(1), 69–85.
  • Shaker, M. I. (1980). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979 Volume 1. London ; Rome ; New York: Oceana Publications.
  • Smith, R. K. (1987). Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory. International Organization, 41(2), 253–281.
  • Solingen, E. (2007). Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Stein, A. A. (1982). Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. International Organization, 36(2), 299–324.
  • Tacar, P. Y. (1970). Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesi Sorunu. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Atom Enerjisi Komisyonu.
  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (2016, November 5). Retrieved November 5, 2016, from UN Office of Legal Affairs website: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html
  • Udum, Ş. (2017). Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, 22(2), 57–84.
  • UN General Assembly Meeting Records A/PV.17. (1946, January 24). Retrieved from https://undocs.org/en/A/PV.17
  • Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
  • Young, O. R. (1989). The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment. International Organization, 43(3), 349–375.

THE FORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORIES

Year 2022, Volume: 17 Issue: 57, 447 - 467, 30.01.2022

Kahraman Süvari Çiğdem Nas

https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.929259

Abstract

This study examines the factors affecting the emergence of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the main mechanism of the international regime formed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, through the basic assumptions of the regime theories. This study addresses the following question: What factors were at play when the NPT was formed? This study’s research method is testing theoretical assumptions with a case study. Within this framework, the regime theories used in this study concern especially why states cooperate over a specific issue. Factors affecting the formation and persistence of regimes are examined through three different approaches in the regime theories: power-based, cognitive-based, and interest-based approaches. The NPT seems to have a two-tier structure. Still, all actors that become a party to the treaty benefit from this cooperation. In this context, this study argues that the assumptions of interest-based approaches about the emergence of the NPT are more explanatory than others.

Keywords

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty international regimes cooperation nuclear disarmament

References

  • 60 Years of “Atoms for Peace” [Text]. (2013, December 6). Retrieved November 5, 2016, from International Atomic Energy Agency website: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/60-years-atoms-peace
  • Aiken, F. (1961). Can We Limit the Nuclear Club? Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17(7), 263–266.
  • Athanasopulos, H. (2000). Nuclear Disarmament in International Law. Jefferson, N.C: McFarland & Company.
  • Bajia, D. S. (1997). The Concept of Nuclear Proliferation: Need For Reconsideration. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 10(1), 47–50.
  • Basics of IAEA Safeguards. Retrieved August 3, 2021, from IAEA website: https://www.iaea.org/topics/basics-of-iaea-safeguards
  • Bellany, I. (1977). Nuclear Non-Proliferation and the Inequality of States. Political Studies, 25(4), 594–598.
  • Bunn, G. (2003, December). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: History and Current Problems. Retrieved from Arms Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/Bunn
  • Burns, E. L. M. (1969). The Nonproliferation Treaty: Its Negotiation and Prospects. International Organization, 23(4), 788–807.
  • Carlson, J., Kuchinov, V., & Shea, T. (2020, May 11). The IAEA’s Safeguards System as the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Verification Mechanism. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved from https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_Paper_Safeguards_FINAL_5-8-20.pdf
  • China’s First Nuclear Test 1964—50th Anniversary. (2014, October 16). Retrieved April 15, 2020, from The National Security Archive website: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb488/
  • Cottrell, M. P. (2016). The Evolution and Legitimacy of International Security Institutions. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
  • Davenport, K. (2019). The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. San Rafael,CA: Morgan & Claypool Publishers.
  • Davis, Z. S. (1993). The Realist Nuclear Regime. Security Studies, 2(3–4), 79–99.
  • Declassified Paper of The Defence and Oversea Policy (Official) Committee. (1965, January 14). Retrieved from https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/selected_key_documents_from_uk_state_papers_1965.pdf
  • Establishment of A Commission to Deal With The Problem Raised By The Discovery of Atomic Energy. (1946, January 24). Retrieved from General Assembly Resolutions Adopted By the General Assembly During Its First Session website: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/1/ares1.htm
  • Fact Sheet on DPRK Nuclear Safeguards. (2014, July 25). Retrieved May 10, 2021, from IAEA website: https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/dprk/fact-sheet-on-dprk-nuclear-safeguards
  • Fischer, D. (1998). The Evolution of IAEA Safeguards. Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency.
  • Gehring, T. (1994). Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Governance. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
  • Goldberg, A. (1964). The Atomic Origins of the British Nuclear Deterrent. International Affairs, 40(3), 409–429.
  • Haas, E. B. (1990). When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations. Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Haggard, S., & Simmons, B. A. (1987). Theories of International Regimes. International Organization, 41(3), 491–517.
  • Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P., & Rittberger, V. (1997). Theories of International Regimes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Hirsch, T. (2004). The IAEA Additional Protocol What It is and Why It Matters. Nonproliferation Review, (140–166).
  • Hoffman, A. M. (2002). A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations. European Journal of International Relations, 8(3), 375–401.
  • Jervis, R. (1982). Security Regimes. International Organization, 36(2), 357–378.
  • Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63.
  • Jönsson, C. (1995). Cognitive Factors in Regime Dynamics. In V. Rittberger (Ed.), Regime Theory and International Relations (pp. 202–222). Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA.
  • Keohane, R. O. (1984). After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
  • Keohane, R. O. (1988). International Institutions: Two Approaches. International Studies Quarterly, 32(4), 379–396.
  • Khlopkov, A. V. (2017, September). Roland Timerbaev: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Has Largely Achieved Its Goals | Arms Control Association. Retrieved April 14, 2020, from Arms Control Association website: https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-09/interviews/roland-timerbaev-nuclear-nonproliferation-treaty-largely-achieved-its-goals
  • Knopf, J. W. (2012). Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses. In Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation (pp. 13–38). Stanford, California: Stanford Security Studies.
  • Krasner, S. D. (1982). Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization, 36(2), 185–205.
  • Krass, A. S., Boskma, P., Elzen, B., & Smit, W. A. (1983). Uranium Enrichment and Nuclear Weapon Proliferation. London: SIPRI (Taylor & Francis Ltd).
  • Krause, J. (2007). Enlightenment and Nuclear Order. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 83(3), 483–499.
  • Lynch, A. (1991). The Soviet Union: Nuclear weapons and their role in security policy. In R. C. Karp (Ed.), Security with Nuclear Weapons?: Different Perspectives on National Security (pp. 100–124). New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Lynch, C. (2010, April 30). The nuclear caste system. Retrieved February 10, 2021, from Foreign Policy website: https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/04/30/the-nuclear-caste-system/
  • Mearsheimer, J. J. (1994). The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security, 19(3), 5–49.
  • Miller, N. L. (2014). Nuclear Dominoes: A Self-Defeating Prophecy? Security Studies, 23(1), 33–73.
  • Milner, H. (1992). International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses. World Politics, 44(3), 466–496.
  • Müller, H. (2017). The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in Jeopardy? Internal Divisions and the Impact of World Politics. The International Spectator, 52(1), 12–27.
  • Nadelmann, E. A. (1990). Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in International Society. International Organization, 44(4), 479–526.
  • Nayar, B. R. (1995). Regimes, Power, and International Aviation. International Organization, 49(1), 139–170.
  • Nonproliferation Treaty: Hearings Before the Ninetieth Congress Second Session on Executive H, 90th Congress, Second Session, Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (1968). Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office.
  • Nye, J. S. (1985). NPT: The Logic of Inequality. Foreign Policy, (59), 123–131.
  • Paul, T. V. (2003). Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime 1. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16(1), 135–154.
  • Powaski, R. E. (1989). March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present. New York: Oxford University Press.
  • Prevention of the wider dissemination of nuclear weapons (A/RES/1665(XVI)). (1962). Retrieved April 14, 2020, from United Nations Digital Library website: http://digitallibrary.un.org/record/204596
  • Radchenko, S. (Trans.). (1968, April 9). Excerpts from Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev’s speech at the April 1968 Plenum of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGANI: fond 2, opis 3, delo 95, listy 35-44. Retrieved from https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177818
  • Rauf, T. (2017). Fiftieth Anniversary of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Preparing for a Successful Outcome Asia Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament. Asia Pacific Leadership Network Policy Briefs, (48).
  • Reiss, M. (1988). Without the Bomb: The Politics of Nuclear Nonproliferation. New York: Columbia University Press.
  • Rossin, D. A. (2001). Secrecy and Misguided Policy. The Center for International Security and Cooperation. Retrieved from http://www.iaea.org/inis/collection/NCLCollectionStore/_Public/33/048/33048040.pdf
  • Rublee, M. R. (2008). Taking Stock of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime: Using Social Psychology to Understand Regime Effectiveness. International Studies Review, 10(3), 420–450.
  • Ruzicka, J., & Wheeler, N. J. (2010). The Puzzle of Trusting Relationships in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), 86(1), 69–85.
  • Shaker, M. I. (1980). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origin and Implementation, 1959-1979 Volume 1. London ; Rome ; New York: Oceana Publications.
  • Smith, R. K. (1987). Explaining the Non-Proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory. International Organization, 41(2), 253–281.
  • Solingen, E. (2007). Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
  • Stein, A. A. (1982). Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. International Organization, 36(2), 299–324.
  • Tacar, P. Y. (1970). Nükleer Silahların Yayılmasının Önlenmesi Sorunu. Ankara: T.C. Başbakanlık Atom Enerjisi Komisyonu.
  • Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (2016, November 5). Retrieved November 5, 2016, from UN Office of Legal Affairs website: http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/tnpt/tnpt.html
  • Udum, Ş. (2017). Nuclear Energy and International Relations: Outlook and Challenges for Newcomers. PERCEPTIONS: Journal of International Affairs, 22(2), 57–84.
  • UN General Assembly Meeting Records A/PV.17. (1946, January 24). Retrieved from https://undocs.org/en/A/PV.17
  • Waltz, K. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
  • Young, O. R. (1989). The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural Resources and the Environment. International Organization, 43(3), 349–375.
There are 63 citations in total.

Details

Primary Language English
Journal Section Makale Başvuru
Authors

Kahraman Süvari 0000-0002-8137-9010

Çiğdem Nas 0000-0001-6846-2728

Early Pub Date January 28, 2022
Publication Date January 30, 2022
Published in Issue Year 2022 Volume: 17 Issue: 57

Cite

APA Süvari, K., & Nas, Ç. (2022). THE FORMATION OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY: AN ANALYSIS BASED ON INTERNATIONAL REGIME THEORIES. Öneri Dergisi, 17(57), 447-467. https://doi.org/10.14783/maruoneri.929259

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Marmara UniversityInstitute of Social Sciences

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