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Doing Justice After Conflict : The Case for Ghana's National Reconciliation Commission

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2014

Robert Kwame Ameh
Affiliation:
Department of Sociology, University of New Brunswick, PO Box 4400, Fredericton, N.B. E3B 5A3Canada, ameh@unb.ca

Abstract

Ghana joined a group of transitional democracies in the world by establishing a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which started work in September 2002. The NRC was mandated to investigate past atrocities and human rights violations, recommend appropriate compensation for victims, and reconcile the nation. But expectations among Ghanaians of the ability of the NRC to heal the wounds of the past, end the cycle of vengeance and vendettas, and reconcile the nation have been mixed even after the NRC completed its work and submitted its report in October 2004. This paper makes a case for Ghana's NRC. It argues that a National Reconciliation Commission is a better way of dealing with the egregious human rights violations in Ghana's past than the alternatives available.

Résumé

Le Ghana a rejoint le groupe des démocraties en transition en créant la Commission de réconciliation nationale (CRN), qui débuta ses travaux en 2002. Elle reçut le mandat d'enquêter sur les atrocités et violations des droits humains passées, de recommander des compensations adéquates pour les victimes et de réconcilier la nation. Or, les attentes et la confiance des Ghanéens en la capacité de la CRN de guérir les blessures du passé, mettre un terme au cycle de vengeance et de vendettas et de réconcilier la nation furent partagées depuis que la Commission termina ses travaux et remit son rapport, en octobre 2004. Cet article prend position pour la Commission de réconciliation nationale au Ghana, soutenant qu'elle est la meilleure parmi les solutions possibles pour traiter des violations passées des droits humains au Ghana.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Canadian Law and Society Association 2006

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References

1 New Patriotic Party, Agenda for Positive Change: Manifesto 2000 of the New Patriotic Party (n.d.) at 37Google Scholar. The literature, however, shows that Mike Oquaye, a Professor of Political Science at the University of Ghana, and Minister of Energy in the current NPP government, was the first Ghanaian to call for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Ghana. See Oquaye, Mike, “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC regime in Ghana” (1995) 17:3Hum. Rts. Q. 556CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Republic of Ghana, “The National Reconciliation Commission Bill” (Accra: Government Printer Assembly, 2001)Google Scholar GPC/A349/300/7/2001.

3 A professional biography of the NRC members is posted at the Commission's website online: Ghana National Reconciliation Commission >http://www.nrcghana.org/commissioners.php<.

4 In this paper, I use the acronym “NRC” to refer specifically to the Ghana National Reconciliation Commission, while using “TRC” for Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in general.

5 The NRC report is available online at the Ghana government website NRC Report online: Official Website of the Republic of Ghana >http://www.ghana.gov.gh/NRC/.

6 See Republic of Ghana, Parliamentary Debates (Official Report) (23 November 2001) at column 1652.

7 Ameh, Robert, “Uncovering Truth: Excavating Facts Surrounding Past Human Rights Abuses: The Case of Ghana's National Reconciliation Commission” (forthcoming in 2006) Contemporary Justice ReviewGoogle Scholar.

8 Bebli, Bismark, ‘“Shadow Vice President’ Finds his Voice: Martin Amidu Blasts NRC (…) they should dismantle and go” Ghanaian Chronicle (1 July 2004) online: Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2320>>Google Scholar. See also the NRC's response to Amidu: Omaboe, Kojo, “NRC takes ‘Shadow Veep’ to School” Ghanaian Chronicle (Monday, 5 July 2004) online: <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2361>Google Scholar.

9 My categories were inspired by that of Dr.Afrifa, A., “Reconciliation or De-Conciliation” that appeared in The Ghanaian Chronicle (2 October 2002) online: >http://db.ghanaianchronicle.com/index.asp<Google Scholar. In this article, Dr. Afrifa, a professor of psychology at the University of Ghana, identified two major reactions to the reconciliation idea by the Ghanaian public: (i) the “Forgive and Forget” group, and (ii) the “Don't Forgive and Forget” groups. He sub-divided each of these groups into two, with the former having the sub-divisions “Pacifists” and “Apologists”; and the latter having the “Vengeance” and “Forgive but Don't Forget” sub-groups. While his categories and labels may be an apt description of some of the groups in Ghana's reconciliation debate, I find them limiting as they do not reflect the full range of possible groupings one can discern from the materials currently available on Ghana's national reconciliation exercise. For example, the “Forgive but don't Forget group”, which Afrifa rightly perceives as “the spirit of reconciliation” does not belong in the same category as the “Vengeance” group, whose ideals Afrifa, nevertheless, rightly portrayed as negating the ideals of reconciliation. Consequently, I prefer to classify the “Forgive, but Don't Forget” group in a separate “Reconciliation” category of its own, with its own sub-categories. I also think the “Vengeance” Group could be sub-divided into a “Criminal Justice/Retribution” and “Vengeance/Hatred” groups. It is also possible to conceive of a fourth major category, the “Apathetic” group, which comprises the thousands of Ghanaians whose rights have been trampled on but who chose not to be part of this whole national reconciliation exercise in Ghana. Many of these people reside in the Diaspora. But since it was a “silent” group that did not engage in the NRC debate, it will not be addressed in this paper.

11 Both are expressions in the twi language, the dominant language spoken in Ghana, “εnyε whee” means “it doesn't matter” and “fa ma Nyame” means “leave it to God”. So the syndrome the two expressions represent is the tendency among Ghanaians to leave vengeance to God, instead of taking matters into their own hands and being vindictive.

12 Ghana Center for Democratic Development, “Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana: Survey Evidence” CDD-Ghana Research Papers (Accra: CDD-Ghana, 2001)Google Scholar.

13 This group contributed less than 5% of the materials I have on the debate from all my sources: media, parliamentary debates, and in-person interviews.

14 An example is the conflicting testimonies of Mathew Adabuga, Mathias Cudjoe, Boakye Djan, Baah Achamfour, and Ansa Atiemo, who were all former military men and loyal servants of the AFRC or PNDC military regimes. These former soldiers gave contradictory accounts of the execution of the former Heads of State and military officers, while Boakye Djan and Ansah Atiemo on the one hand, and Baah Achamfour on the other, gave conflicting statements on the events leading to the AFRC military coup d'état. See National Reconciliation Commission Public Hearing: Transcripts of Proceedings Held At the Old Parliament House, Accra, on Thursday 22nd May 2003 at 9:35am (# ACC00739, Cpl. Mathew Adabuga) and on Thursday 12th June 2003 at 9:40am (# ACC01164, Mathias Cudjoe). The full text of Boakye Djan's statement submitted to the NRC is available online at the Ghana Home Page, “AFRC Petition statement by Boakye Djan” (13 October 2003), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=46866>>Google Scholar. It is also available at “Boakye Djan's Statement to NRC on AFRC” online: JoyOnline <http://www.myjoyonline.com/newsarchives>>Google Scholar. Baah Achamfour, a former member of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, in his testimony at the NRC also contradicted the statement of Boakye Djan; see, “Achamfour testifies before NRC” (29 June 2004) online: Ghana News Agency <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=60692>>Google Scholar. See also, “Afrifa's Ghost Again (…) AFRC Capo Explains!” (5 July 2004), online: Accra Daily Mail <http://www.accra-mail.com/story.asp?id=10528>>Google Scholar. Ansah Atiemo, also a former member of the AFRC, in turn accused Baah Achamfour of lying, see Atiemo, Ansah “Baah Achamfour: A Witness of Untruth” (July 8, 2004), online: Ghana Home Page http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=61224Google Scholar. See also, Atiemo, Ansah, “Anti-Constitution Coup Fears: A Bubble or Gathering Storm?” (19 January 2004), online: Ghana Home Page http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=50070>Google Scholar; this was followed by a rejoinder by Ennin, Baffour that debunked the claims of the ex-AFRC member (24 January 2004), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=50473>Google Scholar; and another rejoinder by Obeng-Diawuoh, B. K., (29 January 2004), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/News/Archive/artikel.php?ID=50808>Google Scholar.

The Heritage newspaper also recently came out with evidence called from past speeches made by the AFRC leaders, including Boakye Djan that shows a discrepancy between the justifications given in their speeches (while they were still members of the AFRC) and the reasons stated in Boakye Djan's NRC statement for killing the Generals. See Asah-Asante, Richard, “Execution of Generals in 1979: Boakye Djan Lied to NRC” (January 12, 2004), online: The Heritage Online <www.theheritagenews.com/article.asp?id=898>Google Scholar. The apparent disagreement among the former members of the AFRC prompted the following headline in the Concord newspaper: Ogbamey, Alfred, “Fight Breaks Out Among AFRC Members” (13 July 2004), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=61529>Google Scholar.

15 For example, Adabuga has confessed to murder and has asked for forgiveness from Ghanaians. A section of Ghanaians have virtually asked members of the vengeance and hatred group to “back off” and leave Ghanaians alone as shown in Gyasi, I.K., “Boakye Djan, JJ, and Ghana” (April 19, 2004), online: The Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?ID=1330>Google Scholar.

16 The three feature articles of Asare, Stephen Kwaku are, “Forget About Reconciliation” (July 2001), online: Ghana Review International <http://www.ghanareviewcom>Google Scholar; “TRC, how far do we go back?” (July 3, 2001), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=22739>>Google Scholar; and “The Truth and Reconciliation Exercise is a Sham” (23 October 2002), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=28621>>Google Scholar.

17 “Rawlings Was Cruel and Corrupt–Kwaku Azar” exclusive interview with the Ghanaian Chronicle (6 November 2002), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com>>Google Scholar.

18 Stephen Kwaku Asare is a regular contributor to Ghana online discussion forums such as Okyeame, Say It Loud (SIL), and Ghana Home Page. He often writes under the alias Kwaku Azar on these forums.

19 Asare, Stephen Kwaku, “The Truth and Reconciliation Exercise is a Sham” (23 October 2002), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=28621>Google Scholar.

23 For example, Asare's claim that there are no identifiable parties to conflict in Ghana, that the AFRC and PNDC governments have been the only regimes that committed crimes against humanity and engaged in other human rights violations in Ghana, and that the NRC Act grants blanket amnesty to perpetrators.

24 See the Ghanaian Criminal Code (Act 29) 1960, the Criminal Procedure Code (Act 30) 1960, the 1992 Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, especially c. 11, s. 125-61) relating to the Judiciary.

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26 See for example Amadiume, Ifi and An-Na'im, Abdullahi, eds., The Politics of Memory: truth, healing, and social justice (New York: Zed Books, 2000)Google Scholar; Rotberg, Robert and Thompson, Dennis, eds., Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Soyinka, Wole, The Burden of Memory: The Muse of Forgiveness (New York: Oxford University Press, (1999)Google Scholar; and Gibson, James, “Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation: judging the fairness of amnesty in South Africa” (2002) 46:3American Journal of Political Science 540CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

28 See Garkawe, Sam, “The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a suitable model to enhance the role and rights of the victims of gross violations of human rights” (2003) 14 Melbourne University Law Review, online: <http://www.worldlii.org/au/journals/MULR/2003/14/htmlGoogle Scholar; Zalaquet, Jose, “Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations” (1992) Hastings L.J. 1425Google Scholar; and Phillips, Timothy and Albon, Mary, “When Prosecution is not possible: Alternative Means of Seeking Accountability for War Crimes” in Cooper, Belinda, ed., War Crimes: The Legacy of Nuremberg. (New York: TV Books, 1999) 220Google Scholar.

29 See, for example, Adam, Heribert, “Trading Justice For Truth” The World Today (January 1998) 11Google Scholar; Biggar, Nigel, ed., Burying the Past: making peace and doing justice after civil conflict (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2003)Google Scholar; Goldstone, Richard J., “Justice as a Tool for Peacemaking: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals” (1996) 28(3) N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 485Google Scholar; Minow, Martha, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998)Google Scholar; Robertson, Geoffrey, Crimes Against Humanity: the struggle for global justice (New York: The New Press, 2002)Google Scholar; and van Zyl, Paul, “Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (1999) 52:2Journal of International Affairs 647Google Scholar.

31 Hayner, Priscilla B., Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001)Google Scholar and Teitel, Ruti G., Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)Google Scholar.

32 Akuffo-Addo, Nana, “Memorandum: The National Reconciliation Commission Bill” (Accra: Government Printer Assembly, 2001)Google Scholar GPC/A349/300/7/2001.

33 Rothchild, DonaldColonial Bargaining As Tactics: The Ghana Experience, 1954-1957” (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002)Google Scholar Paper presented at the SAIS Annual Conference on Africa at the African Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University. Cited in Adu-Asare, R. Y., “Baffour Akoto: Legendary National Figure But No Hero” (29 October 2002) online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=28798>Google Scholar.

35 Austin, Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964)Google Scholar and Bing, Geoffrey, Reap the Whirlwind: an account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950-1966 (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1968)Google Scholar.

36 When the NRC started receiving statements from the public on September 3, 2002, a woman, who claimed to be a victim of the 1966 coup d'état was one of the first to file a complaint. This woman was amputated as a result of injuries she suffered in a bomb blast at the Accra Sports Stadium in 1967 (MyJoyOnline news, September 4, 2002). Four cases were heard at the Commission's maiden sitting on Tuesday, January 14, 2003. All of these involved unlawful arrest, detention, dismissal, and ill treatment under the Preventive Detention Act (PDA), 1958, during the constitutional regime of Dr Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first Prime Minister, and during the 1966 coup d'état that toppled his regime. The four petitioners were Mr. Amarkai Laryea Amarteifio, Mr. Albert Kpakpo Allotey, Mr. Emmanuel Nii Amartey Adjaye, and Mr. Thomas Ekow Halm.

37 Nana Akuffo-Addo, supra note 32.

38 Aikins, Justice G.E.K., “The Political and Legal Framework for Ghana's Reconciliation Process” (Paper delivered at the Ghana Journalists Association Workshop at Volta Hall, Akosombo, June 21-23, 2002) [unpublished] at 2Google Scholar.

39 Matthias Ofori, a victim of “Apollo 568,” narrated his case before the NRC on July 8, 2004. See, Ghana News Agency, “Victim of ‘Apollo 568’ – Ex-Graphic Boss” (8 July 2004), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=61301>>Google Scholar.

40 The murdered High Court Judges were Justice Kwadwo Agyei Agyepong, Justice Cecilia Koranteng-Addo and Justice Fred Poku Sarkodee. The retired military officer was Major Sam K. Acquah.

41 The former Heads of State executed were General I.G.K. Acheampong and General Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa while the top military officers included General Akuffo, General Utuka, General Kotei, Air Vice-Marshall Boakye, Rear Admiral Amedume and Colonel Felli.

42 Classic among these are Adjei, Mike, Death and Pain in Rawlings' Ghana; the Inside Story (London: Black Line Publishing, 1994)Google Scholar; Yidana, Jacob Jabuni, Who Killed the Judges? Ghana in Retrospect (Accra: Bismi Enterprise, 2002)Google Scholar; Agyekum, George, The Judges' Murder Trial of 1983: Proceedings, Judgment and Miscellaneous (Accra: Justice Trust Publications, 1999)Google Scholar; Shillington, Kevin, Ghana and the Rawlings Factor (London: MacMillan Press, 1992)Google Scholar; Attafuah, Ken, Criminal Justice Policy, Public Tribunals and the Administration of Justice in Rawlings' Ghana (1982-1992): a Study in Political Economy of Revolutionary Social Change and Criminal Law Reform (Ph. D. dissertation. School of Criminology, Simon Fraser University, 1993)Google Scholar [unpublished], and Oquaye, Mike, “Human Rights and the Transition to Democracy under the PNDC regime in Ghana” (1995) 17:3Hum. Rts Q. 556CrossRefGoogle Scholar. There is even a website, www.prosecuterawlings.com, completely devoted to eliciting evidence on the human rights violations of Rawlings' regimes.

43 Many Ghanaians reject the report of the Special Investigations Board, which was set up to investigate the murder of the judges and retired army officer.

44 Section 3(1) of Act 611, National Reconciliation Act.

45 Former President J.J. Rawlings was reported to have remarked at an election rally that the ruling NPP government should start extension projects on two prisons in Ghana (Nsawam and James Fort) where political prisoners are usually kept because if the NDC won the election, they would try all corrupt officials of the current government. See Kewura, Simmons Yussif, “Jerry in His Element: (…) Attacks NPP government again (…) Says NDC government will imprison corrupt NPP officials (…)” The Ghanaian Chronicle (July 22, 2004) online: <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2587>Google Scholar. In an interview with the Ghanaian Chronicle during the 2004 election campaign, Prof. John Atta Mills, the NDC presidential candidate stated that an NDC government under his leadership would investigate all corruption cases against NPP officials. See Kewura, Simmons Yussif, “Mills Condemns Harassment: Talks about His Wife's BNI Encounter” (November 4, 2004), online: Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=4114>Google Scholar.

46 These ministers under the NDC government, Peprah (Minister of Finance and Economic Planning), Ibrahim Adam (Minister of Agricultue), Selormey (Deputy Minister of Finance and Economic Planning) were convicted by the Accra Fast Track Court and served various jail terms, having been charged under the “causing financial loss to the state” law.

47 Former first lady, Mrs. Nana Agyeman Konadu Rawlings; Tsatsu Tsikata, former Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana National Procurement Agency and advisor to the former President J.J. Rawlings; Dan Abodakpi, former NDC MP and Minister of Trade and Industries, Hanny Sherry Ayittey, former Managing Director of the Ghana Industrial Holding Company (GIHOC) and Treasurer of the 31 December Women's Movement of which Mrs. Rawlings, wife of former President Rawlings is President, are currently on trial charged with “causing financial loss to the state.”

48 Stephen Kwaku Asare, supra note 16.

49 Donald Rothchild, supra note 33.

50 Nana Akuffo-Addo, supra note 32 at 4.

51 Hayner, Priscilla, Unspeakable Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (New York: Routledge, 2001)Google Scholar.

52 See supra note 28.

53 Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 (Accra-Tema: Assembly Press of Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1992) c. 5, art. 12-33)Google Scholar.

54 Ibid. c. 18, art. 216-30).

55 Attafuah, Kenneth, “An Overview of the National Reconciliation Commission of Ghana and the Question of Torture, Reparation, and Prevention” (Paper presented at an international seminar organized by the Association for the Prevention of Torture in Mexico City, July 18-20, 2002) [unpublished] at 6Google Scholar.

56 The full text of the Transitional Provisions is available online: Ghana Review International <http://www.ghanareview.com/parlia/Gschedulel.html>.

57 NRC Report, supra note 5, vol. 1, c. 6 at 158.

58 Nana Akuffo-Addo, supra note 32.

59 Attafuah, supra note 55 at 9-10.

60 Okyere-Darko, Eric, “New Remedy Meets Old Resistance: The Constitutionality of National Reconciliation in Ghana” (n.d) at 2325Google Scholar. This paper is available from the author at the International Centre for Transitional Justice in New York, where he works.

61 Teitel, Ruti, “Transitional Jurisprudence” (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 2009CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Teitel restates these ideas in her book, Transitional Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000) at 213–30Google Scholar.

62 Republic of Ghana, supra note 53, c. 25, s. 37 of the Transitional Provisions.

63 Ghana News Agency, “Electoral Commission Releases Final Results of Election 2004” (11 January 2005), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=73195>>Google Scholar.

64 Ghana Law Reform Commission, The Impact of the Constitutional Provisions on the Customary Disabilities of Women in Ghana: Report on the Abolition of Ritual, Slavery, Forced Labor, and Other Related Practices, (Accra, Ghana, 1995)Google Scholar. The report is available at the Commission.

65 NRC Report, supra note 5, vol. 3, c. 3, at 167-68.

66 Three officials of the Rawlings' government were jailed on charges of conspiracy and for wilfully causing financial loss of 20 million dollars to the State in a rice project at Aveyime in the Volta Region. Kwame Peprah, former Minister of Finance, was sentenced to a four-year jail term while Ibrahim Adam, Former Minister of Food and Agriculture and George Yankey, a Former Director of Legal Sector, Private and Financial Institutions of the Ministry of Finance, were each sentenced to two years. While Ibrahim Adam and George Yankey both served their full sentences, Kwame Peprah was granted a presidential remission in March 2005 after serving about half his sentence.

67 Tsatsu Tsikata, ex-Chief Executive of the Ghana National Petroleum Corporation (GNPC), and a key Advisor to the former President of Ghana, J. J. Rawlings, is being tried for allegedly willfully causing financial loss (of several million dollars) to the state. Further, he has been charged with intentionally misapplying funds belonging to GNPC to acquire shares in Valley Farms, a private limited liability company. The case has been going on since 2001.

68 The slow pace of work at the Fast Track Courts (FTCs) prompted this article by Benson, Ivy, “Fast Track Courts Not Fast Enough–Statistics Indicate” (March 25, 2004), online: The Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=1018>Google Scholar. According to Ivy Benson, 61.9% of the 472 cases that had gone before the FTCs since their creation in March, 2001 were still pending by March 2004 when she did the investigation for her article.

69 Toggia, Pietro, “Justice Long Overdue: Genocidal Trials in East Africa” (Paper presented at the 40th Annual Conference of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Boston: MA, March 4-8, 2003) [unpublished]Google Scholar.

70 See Ameh, supra note 7, for more on this.

71 Van Ness, Daniel and Strong, Karen, Restoring Justice (Cincinnati: Anderson, 2002) [Restoring Justice]Google Scholar sees restorative justice as a “new pattern of thinking” about crime and justice at 15. Zehr, Howard, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Waterloo, Ont.: Herald Press, 1990) [Changing Lenses]Google Scholar describes it as “a new paradigm”, a new lens through which we look at crime and justice at 175. Sharpe, Susan, Restorative Justice: A Vision For Healing and Change (Edmonton: Edmonton Victim Offender Mediation Society, 1998) [Restorative Justice: A Vision for Healing]Google Scholar sees restorative justice as an orientation and defines it as “(…) a set of values and beliefs about what justice means, which in turn points to principles for responding to criminal harms” at 19.

72 For the limited rights and role assigned victims under the retributive justice system, which has led to the rise of the victims' rights movement, see Roach, Kent, Due Process and Victims' Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999) c. 9 at 279309CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cayley, David, The Expanding Prison: The Crisis in Crime and Punishment and the Search for Alternatives (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1998) at 3640Google Scholar; Normandeau, Andre, “For a Canadian and International Charter of Rights for Crime Victims” (1983) 25 Can. J. Crim. 463Google Scholar; Christie, Nils, “Conflict as Property” (1977) 17 Brit. J. Crim. 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Restoring Justice, supra note 71 at 127-51.

73 According to Howard Zehr “Crime is a violation of people and relationships which needs healing” (Changing Lenses, supra note 71 at 15-32, 181-86, 191-96) or as Daniel Van Ness and Karen Strong put it, “Crime is understood [by restorative justice advocates] to cause multiple injuries to victims, the community, and even the offender–injuries that must be repaired” (Restoring Justice, supra note 71 at 37). See also, Morris, Ruth, Stories of Transformative Justice (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2002) at 914Google Scholar.

74 See for example Garkawe, SamThe South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a suitable model to enhance the role and rights of the victims of gross violations of human rights” (2003) 14 Melbourne U.L. Rev., online: http://www.worldlii.org/au/journals/MULR/2003/14/htmlGoogle Scholar; Goldstone, Richard J., “Justice as a Tool for Peacemaking: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals” (1996) 28:3N.Y.U.J. Int'l L. & Pol. 485Google Scholar; Leebaw, Bronwyn, “Restorative Justice For Political Transitions: Lessons from the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (2001) 4:3–4Contemporary Justice Review 2Google Scholar67; and Villa-Vicencio, Charles, “A different kind of Justice: The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” (1999) 1 Contemporary Justice Review 407Google Scholar

75 See Ameh, Robert, “The NRC Report: A Review” (Paper presented at the annual conference of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences, Baltimore, US, March 2006) [unpublished]Google Scholar.

76 The murder of the Yaa Na, the Dagamba Overlord, and about 40 of his elders at his palace in broad daylight in March 2002 under the watch of the current NPP government for which arrests were made two years later but the suspects not yet put on trial, readily comes to mind. The funeral of the Yaa Na was recently held, in April 2006. While some have accused the government of complicity in the murder, the government has presented the incident as a family feud between the two factions of the Dagomba royal family, the “Abudu gate” and the “Andani gate.”

77 For example, the President has been accused of filling his government and awarding important state positions to his family members and people from his Akan ethnic group. The ruling NPP government has also been accused of favoring some traditional rulers over others.

78 The arrest and subsequent death in military detention of Alhaji Issah Mobila, CPP Regional Chairman of the Northern Region on December 9, 2004 (just two days after the December 2004 elections) and the autopsy report that confirmed that he died as a result of the violence he was subjected to is a good example of this.

79 While the NPP government has not investigated allegations of corruption and impropriety against its officials and appointees (e.g. Bamba's visa scandal), the government has been quick to arraign officials and appointees of the former NDC government before the Fast-Track Courts on the charge of “causing financial loss to the state.” See supra notes 66 & 67 for a brief summary of the Quality Grain and Tsatsu Tsikata court cases against some officials of the previous regime. President J.A. Kuffour, in response to the allegations of corruption and impropriety of his ministers and officials, was reported to have stated on the campaign trail in the run-up to the 2004 elections that corruption was not unique to his officials and that it had existed since the time of Adam. So instead of asking the police to investigate the allegations as the government always does in the case of NDC officials and appointees, the President has challenged the public to tender whatever evidence of corruption they have against his officials to the police.

80 Teeple, Gary, The Riddle of Human Rights (Aurora, Ontario: Garamond Press, 2004) at 172, 175Google Scholar.

81 Supra note 79.

82 The last half of the 2004 saw the media carrying headlines such as “NDC General Secretary Sounds Alarm: Ghana would be like Liberia” (i.e. that Ghana would become a war-ravaged country like Liberia if the NDC did not win the election) (July 6, 2004), online: The Heritage <http://www.theheritagenews.com/article.asp?id=1187>>Google Scholar; Zakaria, Prince, “NDC, NPP Tension in Tamale: Save Ghana from Liberia Situation–Security Agencies told” (July 16, 2004), online: The Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2506>Google Scholar; Bebli, Bismark, “Who is Beating War Drums, Kufour or Me?” (July 19, 2004), online: The Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2525>Google Scholar; Braimah, Sulemana & Akoto, Brenda O., “National Unity Under Threat NCCE Director Accuses NPP, NDC officials” (July 19, 2004,) online: The Ghanaian Chronicle <http://db.ghanaian-chronicle.com/thestory.asp?id=2541>Google Scholar; and “Commentator Alerts Nation to Violence” (by Vanderpuye, Nii Noi in The Heritage (July 19, 2004) online at <http://www.theheritagenews.com/article.asp?id=1227>Google Scholar.

83 On November 6, 2004, barely one month before the elections, seven ex-soldiers associated with the disbanded 64 Infantry Regiment of the Ghana Armed Forces created under the PNDC government, were arrested for plotting to overthrow the government of Ghana. But so far, only Nicholas Owuobah, who had a pistol, another firearm, 18 rounds of ammunition, and a helmet in his possession, is standing trial on charges of “destabilization and sabotage,” prompting the nick-name, “one-man coup plotter”. All the others have since been released.

84 In August 2003, Lt. Col. Gbevlo-Lartey, Commanding Officer of the disbanded 64 Infantry Regiment, was arrested and expelled from the Ghana Armed Forces also on charges of a coup plot.

85 NRC Report, supra note 5, vol. 3, c. 3 at 167-68.

86 One US dollar equals approximately 10,000.00 Ghanaian cedis.

87 Ghana News Agency, “C13.5bn to Implement Recommendations of NRC” (April 25, 2006), online: Ghana Home Page <http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=103210>>Google Scholar. The NPP government issued a white paper in May 2005 in which it accepted the recommendations of the NRC, which include restitution and setting up of a Reparation and Rehabilitation Fund from which victims would be compensated. The white paper is available online at Government White Paper on NRC Report presented by the Minister For Justice and Attorney-General, Official Website of the Republic of Ghana (April 22, 2005), <http:www.ghanagov.gh/dexadd/WHITE%20PAPER%20ON%20NRC.pdf>.

88 See section 15(2) of the NRC Act (Act 611). This section of the Act has, however, been given different interpretations. The Attorney General in his Memorandum accompanying the NRC Act (see Akuffo-Addo, supra note 32) gave the impression of granting a blanket amnesty to all perpetrators who appear before the Commission. Dr. Ken Attafuah, Executive Secretary of the NRC, however, insists (in an interview granted the author in August 2003) that only perpetrators who believe that their statement at the Commission would be self-incriminatory and who apply for immunity would enjoy this right. This interpretation is more akin to the “accountable amnesty” process of the South African TRC. See Garkawe, SamThe South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission: a suitable model to enhance the role and rights of the victims of gross violations of human rights” (2003) 14 Melbourne U.L. Rev., online: <http://www.worldlii.org/au/journals/MULR/2003/14/htmlGoogle Scholar. At the time of the interview, only one person, Matthew Adabuga, who confessed to killings, had applied and been granted immunity by the NRC. Several scholars have questioned the morality of denying victims the opportunity to pursue justice, which seems implicit in the work of TRCs. See supra note 26.