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366 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY How TO KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE UNKNOWN FACULTY 1 In the Third Meditation, Descartes gives a seldom noted reason for doubting that his ideas have their origin in something external to him: Et pour l'autre raison, qui est que ces id6es doiuent venir d'ailleurs, puisqu'elles ne d6pendent pas de ma volont6, ie ne la trouue non plus conuaincante. Car tout de mesme que ces inclinations, dont ie parlois tout maintenant, se trouuent en moy, nonobstant qu'elles ne s'accordent pas tousiours auec ma volont6, ainsi peutestre qu'il y a en moy quelque facult6 ou puissance propre h produire ees id6es sans rayde d'aucunes choses ext6rieures, bien qu'elle ne me soit pas encore connu~; comme en effet il m'a tousiours sembl6 iusque icy que, lorsque ie dors, elles se forment ainsi en moy sans rayde des objets qu'elles representent. 2 David Fate Norton, in his paper, "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency,''3 argues that this issue is never disposed of. This failure is alleged to have fatal consequences for the positive doctrine of the Meditations. The pivotal issue is whether the possibility of the unknown faculty invalidates Descartes ' first proof for the existence of God. Norton, of course, maintains that it does. In order to examine this claim, we can consider Descartes' first, or causal, proof as consisting of three premises: (1) Descartes' assertion that he possesses an idea of God who is conceived of as having, among other perfections, omniscience;4 (2) Descartes' idea of himself as imperfect, lacking, among other perfections, omniscience;~ and (3) the axiom, "qu'il doit y auoir pour le moins autant de realit6 dans la cause efficiente et totale que dans son effect.... ,,o Descartes concludes that, because of (2) and (3), the source of (1) can only be something other than himself, and that, since anything other than God would lack the perfection that the idea of God reveals, again because of (3), the efficient cause of this idea can only be God himself. Hence, God exists not only as an idea but also as a reality exterior to Descartes' mind. Norton comments as follows: "This conclusion is illicit simply because Descartes is not here in any position to determine what may come from himself. He has an unknown and unexamined faculty--at least he does not know that he has not--and hence he cannot 1 The late Dr. James A. Jordan of Penn State University Capitol Campus, Dr. Matthew Kelly, and the late Dr. Wayne A. R. Leys, both of Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, were kind enough to read earlier versions of this paper. 2 Oeuvres de Descartes, eds. Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12 vols. (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1903), IX, 31; hereafter cited as A.-T. a David Fate Norton, "Descartes on Unknown Faculties: An Essential Inconsistency," Journal of the History o/Philosophy, VI (July, 1968), 245-256. 4 A.-T., IX, 35-36. 5 Descartes links the two premises as follows: "Car comment seroit-il possible que ie peusse connoistre que ie doute & que ie desire, c'est ~ dire qu'il me manque quelque chose & que ie ne suis pas tout parfait, si ie n'auoir en moy aucune id6e d'vn estre plus parfait que le mien, par la comparaison duquel ie connoistrois les d6fauts de ma nature?" (A.-T., IX, 36). 6 A.-T., IX, 32. The equivalence of the degree of reality with the degree of perfection is clear from the following passage: "Et de lh il suit, non seulement que le neant ne scauroit produire aucune chose, mais aussi que ce qui est plus parfait, c'est/l dire qui contient en soy plus de realit6, ne peut estre vne suite &vne d6pendance du moins parfait" (A.-T., IX, 32). NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 367 have, on the basis of the argument so far, any clear and adequate idea of his own capabilities ."~ Norton apparently believes that he has cast doubt on premise (2) by showing that Descartes cannot have "any clear and adequate knowledge of his own capabilities." This, however, assumes that (2) is stronger than it need be; for surely all...

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