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My own conclusion is that “One ought to be moral” makes no sense at all unless the “ought” has the moral subscript, giving a tautology, or else relates morality to some other system such as prudence or etiquette. I am, therefore putting forward quite seriously a theory that disallows the possibility of saying that a man ought (free unsubscripted “ought“) to have ends other than those he does have.- Philippa Foot
H.A. Prichard's “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, like Descartes Meditations, is remembered better for the skeptical moment in the author's thinking than for its unskeptical conclusions. Prichard's paper is complicated, but the lore about its message is simple. The lore is that Prichard pointed out that in trying to vindicate the reason-giving power of morality we might do so by appealing to moral norms or to non-moral norms. If we appeal to moral norms, then we are only justifying a standard in terms of that standard and just about any old standard could survive such a test.
Thanks to Sam Black, Janice Dowell, Josh Gert, and Evan Tiffany for helpful comments on this paper.
2 Foot, Philippa “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” p. 320, note 15, in Darwall, StephenGibbard, Allan and Rail ton's, PeterMoral Discourse and Practice (New York: Oxford University Press).Google Scholar
3 Prichard, H.A. “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, in 20th Century Ethical Theory, ed. Cahn, Steven M. and Haber, Joram G. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 38–39.Google Scholar
4 Ibid., 39.
5 The set of pro-attitudes I have in mind includes counterfactual pro-attitudes or dispositions to have them.
6 Some challenge whether subjective accounts have a rationale for granting authority to idealized desires rather than actual, non-idealized desires.! respond to this challenge in “Subjectivism and Idealization,” Ethics 119 Oanuary 2009): 336-52 The challenge is issued by Arthur Ripstein, “Preference,” in Value, Welfare, and Moralit!f, ed. Frey, R. G. and Morris, Christopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993),CrossRefGoogle Scholar reprinted, with a new conclusion, in Practical Rationality and Prefcmrce, ed. Morris, Christopher and Ripstein, Arthur (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001));CrossRefGoogle ScholarLillehammer, H.L. “Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason,” Jounwl of Ethics 4 (2000): 173-90;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Enoch, David “Why Idealize?” Ethics 115 (2005): 759-87.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
7 On the reasons for action side, see, for example: Williams, Bernard “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 101–113;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Lewis, David “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Procccdill!o(S ∼f tire Aristotclimr Society, suppl. ser., 63 (1989): 113-37.Google Scholar On the well-being side, see: Henry Sidgwick, Tile Metiwds of Ethics, 7th ed. ﹛Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), 111-12; Brandt, Richard B.A Theory of tire Good 1111d tire Right (Oxford: Clarendon, 1979), 10, 113, 329;Google ScholarHarsanyi, john “Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior,” in Utilitarimrism and Beyond, ed. Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 55;Google ScholarRawls, JohnA Tlreory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 407-24;Google ScholarHare, R. M.Moral Tilinkillg (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), 101-5Google Scholar and 214-16. See also Hare 1111d Critics, ed. Senor, Douglas and Fotion, N. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 217-18;Google ScholarRailton, Peter “Facts and Values,” Pirilosopilical Topics 14 ﹛1986): 5–29;CrossRefGoogle ScholarGauthier, DavidMorals By Agreement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986),Google Scholar chap. 2; Griffin, JamesWe/1-Bcillg (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 11–17;Google ScholarPubMed and Kagan, ShellyTile Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 283-91.Google Scholar
8 Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons.” Kantians and neo-Humeans can, and typically do, share a commitment to what Williams labelled “internalism.“ See Korsgaard's, Christine “Skepticism about Practical Reason,” in her Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 311-34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The internalist thought is that an agent's normative reasons must resonate with or motivate her when she has deliberated in an ideally rational way. Neo-Humeans interpret this thought as showing that reasons must be relative to an agent's contingent concerns. Neo-Kantians interpret this thought as showing that rationality can guarantee resonance or motivation, regardless of her contingent psychological make-up. See also Nagel, ThomasThe Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).Google Scholar
9 I move incautiously between claims about “internalism” in Williams’ sense and “subjectivism” in this paper. For my more careful thoughts about the differences between the two and how they work do the disadvantage of the former, see my “Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action,” Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001): 218-35.
10 Even if, as in Plato's Euthyphro, God loves an action if and only if it is good, there remains the question of whether God's love explains the goodness or the go?dness explains the love.
11 Mark, Schroeder's excellent Slaves of the Passions (New York: Oxford, 2008)Google Scholar develops a neo-Humean account according to which this may not be true. In a nutshell, Schroeder argues that because desires are cheap, having a reason to do something is also cheap. Further, he argues, the neo-Humean should reject the view that the weight of reasons is in proportion to the strength of the desire. I hope to criticize Schroeder's view elsewhere but for now I will simply assume that subjectivist views have the upshot that some rational agents lack any reason to be moral.
12 I am not fussing about the distinction between varieties of rationalism. Some such views maintain that morality's instructions just are reasons instructions. Others maintain that reason always permits, but does not always require, one to behave as morality commands. I am assuming the most plausible variant of subjectivism will reject both claims.
13 Some who champion “the Demandingness Objection” against Consequentialism can sound as if they are arguing that Consequentialist morality would require action that diverges too much from our practical reasons, so Consequentialist morality must not be genuine morality. I argue that the Demandingness Objection is not a good ground for rejecting Consequentialism in my “The Impotence of the Demandingness Objection,” Philosophers Imprint (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Digital Library, 2007), vol. 7, no. 8.
14 Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” 320, note 15.
15 The claim that someone is blameworthy need not involve the claim that blaming the person is, all things considered, the thing to do. The claim that someone is not blameworthy need not involve the claim that blaming the person is not the thing to do. Judging that a joke is amusing need not entail the view that, all things considered, it makes sense to be amused by it. Many different types of considerations speak to the question of whether amusement is, all things considered, the thing to feel. But not all of these considerations speak to the question of whether the joke is funny. See Justin D’ Arms and Daniel, Jacobson “The Moralistic Fallacy,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000): 65–90.Google Scholar When I use the terms “judge blameworthy” or “meriting blame,” I mean to screen off these other, more instrumental, sorts of reasons to blame a person.
16 Darwall, StephenThe Second Person Standpoint (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 98.Google Scholar
17 Williams, Bernard “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” in Williams, Making Sense of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
18 Scanlon, T. M.What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998),Google Scholar Appendix, 370-71. While Scanlon does not prefer the option he offers Williams, and seems to want to continue to be an externalist, he concludes that the remaining issues that divide his position from the internalist one he recommends to Williams do not make a “great deal of difference.” 373.
19 Williams, “Some Further Notes on Internal and External Reasons,” in Varieties of Practical Reasoning, ed. Millgram, Elijah (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 95–96.Google Scholar
20 “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” 41.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 For my take on these issues, see my “Explanation, Intemalism, and Reasons for Action,” and “Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action,” Ethics 111 (April 2001): 461-92.
24 I think the former claim entails the latter.
25 Like Williams, I will not say enough about blame to differentiate it from neighbouring concepts. For a detailed account specifically of blame, see Scanlon's, T. M.Moral Dimensions, Harvard University Press, 2008CrossRefGoogle Scholar especially chap. 4, entitled “Blame.” Scanlon's view is that “to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action shows something about the agent's attitude towards others that impairs the relations that others can have with him or her“ (128).
26 Intemalists can with perfect consistency claim that all or almost all humans will have most reason to behave morally. So the threat need not be understood as being that we cannot blame all the actual people we have been tempted to blame. Of course, just because this claim is consistent with intemalism does not make it plausible. The intemalist who wanted to rely on such claims would need to provide reasons, such as a common evolutionary history, for believing that humans overwhelmingly are alike in this respect.
27 Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” 320n15.
28 “Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” 43.
29 Shafer-Landau, RussMoral Realism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 177,CrossRefGoogle Scholar interprets Williams as quite generally focused only on expressions of blame, rather than judgments of blame generally. He claims that “Williams throughout understands blame in its performative mode.” But when we appreciate that someone can be worthy of blame even if there is no point in directing the blame to the agent, Shafer-Landau tells us, we can see the fault in Williams’ thinking. But this claim is too sweeping. Williams does not consistently focus merely on performances of blame. For example, Williams claims that our attitude towards those who are “beyond the pale” is not merely that we cease to blame them but that we cease “thinking that blame is appropriate to them” (“Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,” 43). I think the claim that sticks is that in key places Williams’ arguments can only hope to vindicate performative blame directed towards the person being blamed and that this is not sufficient for his purposes.
30 Could Williams say that our blame that is not directed towards its target is potentially justified in that it signals to others that they have an internal reason to not act in such ways if they care to avoid our blaming them? Even if so, private blame would lack such a rationale and such indirectly justified blame would still be making assertions that Williams must allow to be “incoherent or false.“
31 Foot, Natural Goodness (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Hursthouse, RosalindOn Virtue Ethics (Oxford University Press, 1999).Google Scholar For an assessment of their program, see David Copp and David Sobel, “Morality and Virtue,” Ethics 114 (2004): 514-54.
