‘Glocalizing’ land-use and forest governance in the tropics: examining research partnerships and international forest policies affecting Brazil, DRC and Indonesia

The need for critical analysis

Some of the prevalent ‘solutions’ for improving forest governance are frequently not backed up by available scientific evidence, according to a 2020 review by Delabre et al.,¹⁹ For instance, one myth is that ‘markets are the solution to deforestation and forest degradation’, with forest politics emphasizing voluntary agreements and market mechanisms²⁰ as prevalent and growing forest governance mechanisms. This myth usually comes with the assumption that market-based mechanisms are more efficient and cost-effective than regulations.²¹ Yet, the assessment of ‘efficiency’ changes when social indicators such as well-being are prioritized over economic costs.²²

In assessing sustainability in supply chains, the challenge is not only to identify how a commodity is produced, traded and consumed, but mainly to find the convergence of expectations between buyers and suppliers when it comes to defining ‘sustainability’, and distributing benefits across value chains.²³ Transparency and open-data enterprises have helped such assessments, particularly when supported by technological innovation, big data²⁴ or participatory and independent monitoring systems.²⁵ These mechanisms facilitate sustainability assessments of industrial modes of production, and export-oriented and import-dependent economies, but rarely address well-being or inequality indicators,²⁶ or risks of leakage²⁷ (collateral effect across governance boundaries).²⁸ For instance, export-oriented production systems (such as financial and industrial forest and agri-food practices) have been better positioned to benefit from sustainability verification systems than domestic or ‘civic’ production systems, when these are based on shorter circuits of commercialization, cooperation or reciprocity logics.²⁹

Solutions also prove inadequate when targets, indicators and metrics of so-called ‘good’ forest governance are oversimplified and overlook dynamics of corruption, oppression and marginalization.³⁰ For instance, another known myth influencing decisions at funding, development and implementing levels, is the assumption that local communities are already included in decision-making.³¹ Efforts to include smallholders into international and market initiatives have had only limited results and success.³² Heterogeneity and intersectionality are often oversimplified in ‘participatory’ forums, especially beyond the design phase of an initiative.³³

In sum, the results of forest solutions have varied from limited impacts to selective reforms in governance, with the distribution of costs and benefits of prevalent solutions rarely aligning with principles of sustainability and equity.³⁴ Despite the sum of efforts invested in public regulations, private-led initiatives and hybrid forms of forest governance, the world’s forest area continues to shrink. This area includes the countries with the largest expanses of tropical forests – Brazil, the DRC and Indonesia – where rural and forest peoples struggle for autonomy amid varying levels of poverty, inequality and market integration. Selected indicators of the state of forests and the biggest tropical forest countries are summarized in Table 1.

‘Governance responses to addressing the direct and underlying drivers of deforestation have been inadequate to reduce pressures’, according to the 2022 IPCC assessment on forest governance.⁴² It notes that transformations are needed in several areas, such as the strengthening of environmental laws and policies, better combination of public, private and hybrid initiatives for environmental responsibility, acknowledging land tenure and rights, and enhancing inclusive stakeholder participation to ensure equitable outcomes.⁴³ Also, as remarked by Lambin et al., privately driven mechanisms have the potential to address regulatory gaps in land-use governance in the tropics under ‘appropriate policy mixes’, where ‘various policy instruments perform complementary functions without undermining each other’.⁴⁴ Notably, ‘public regulations maintain an essential role of protecting basic environmental conditions, as well as providing the enabling conditions for private and hybrid initiatives, and pushing standards upward’.⁴⁵ In order transform land-use and forest governance responses, it is essential to redress relationships and partnerships between actors across the Global North and South.

Prior to presenting the analysis led by policy researchers with CEBRAP, CEPAS and CTSS in partnership with Chatham House (Section 3), the next section looks at the challenges and lessons learned in establishing research partnerships between these policy institutes. By doing so, we hope to enable greater political accountability and more inclusive governance, which can be seen as part of a ‘transformative lever towards improving environmental governance and resilience of tropical forests’.⁴⁶

Setting up relationships

A clear set of ground rules on the relationships among partners was established in this project. A first, important step to construct new and more equitable practices was to recognize and openly discuss the asymmetries of power derived from Chatham House’s privileged relationship with funders, which resulted in Chatham House writing and negotiating the proposal, defining its overall scope and allocating budget. Second, an anonymized Equity, Diversity and Inclusion (EDI) survey was conducted in the first months of the partnership, with all researchers involved in the project, to identify how they understood responsibilities and roles in the decision-making process. Arnstein’s ladder of participation⁵⁰ – a framework that describes and identifies different types of participatory spaces ranging from no participation to effective participation – was used to map current modes of relationship and clarify internal decision-making arrangements. Rather than creating a space of ‘formal’ participation, it was important for all partners to clarify which elements of the project could be negotiated and which could not, since they were already established in the agreement between Chatham House and the funder. Discussing this openly avoided forms of ineffective participation such as ‘tokenism’ and ‘manipulation’.⁵¹ Moreover, each participant identified how much decision-making power they were aiming to have in the project and what effective participation meant to them.

One important outcome of the survey was that partners openly negotiated and agreed on the establishment of independent spaces of decision-making with the aim to preserve the autonomy of each policy institute within the limits of the project proposal. In particular, for researchers based in the Global South, it was important to have the autonomy to select their case studies, research methodologies and key literature including scholars writing in languages other than English, such as Portuguese, French and Indonesian. This practice differs from common processes which limit agency of researchers in the Global South. The agreed balance between dependence and independence varied by policy institute, according to the capacities, traditions and preferences stated by the institutes in the Global South, as well as the limits posed by the terms of references agreed between Chatham House and funders. There was no single solution in partnership management, and adaptability was key for Chatham House to accommodate differences within the limits of the project objectives, budget and timeline. Based on the results of the survey, Chatham House staff adjusted project management practices to support more autonomous decision-making in the project. In particular, it was important for Chatham House (CH) staff to recognize that the partners felt the exercise of subtle coercion (later discovered as unintended) when suggestions and recommendations were made by CH staff. This arose both in light of the privileged relationship of Chatham House with the partners and on the basis of implicit assumptions related to its authority as a renowned institution in the UK and in the Global North in general. CH staff were not aware of the coercion felt by partners, particularly when using the verb ‘to encourage’ in meetings. But this was discussed with the EDI consultant, leading to CH staff revisiting their ‘positionality’,⁵² rethinking practices when providing comments and suggestions to partners, and understanding the impact they had on partners’ decisions. Notably, partners had a permanent space to raise grievances or complain about decision-making processes in the project.

At the end of the project, another anonymous survey revealed positive feedback by the partners in the Global South with regards to the management of the project’s decision-making processes, and an appreciation that their inputs and suggestions were collected by an independent consultant and then shared with, and enacted by CH staff. In particular, all participants agreed that decision-making arrangements with Chatham House oscillated between equal decision-making and the co-definition of the research objectives and methodologies, with substantial responsibilities delegated to the partners.

South–South collaborations are often overlooked when compared to North–South research partnerships,⁵³ but this project sought to address this gap. In this research, similarities and differences in the political economies of Brazil, the DRC and Indonesia were acknowledged, vis-à-vis domestic development challenges and the international pressures. The overall assessment was that transnational mechanisms have largely benefited international operators (i.e., donors, banks, multinational companies) rather than local or national stakeholders, and that there was a case for this dynamic to be redressed.

Also, the assumption was that policy institutes in the South would benefit from strengthening ties. For this reason, channels for South–South collaboration with and without mediation by Chatham House were established. Partners in the South engaged in bilateral meetings, presented their results to each other, and exchanged comments on each other’s work. These were important steps to strengthening capacities for collaborations, and to build a collective critique of transnational policies.

EDI in methods and outputs

The inclusion of local knowledge is fundamental to socially just environmental policymaking.⁵⁴ The inclusion of women, Indigenous Peoples (IP) and local communities in knowledge co-production is considered key to tackling the environmental risks related to climate change.⁵⁵ Mindful of this, research partners engaged in a critical reflection on their positionality and on the ways in which their institutional identity could frame project outputs by privileging certain voices over others. It was important to recognize how the political and religious identity of the institutions involved in the project implied the exclusion of certain local voices, and how to deal with this within the research process, and to acknowledge both personal and institutional positionality.

In terms of frameworks and guidance, the researchers discussed diversity and inclusion in research methodology, inclusive terminologies and classifications of agents in forest governance, and the need to use gender-sensitive focus groups or to include questions on gender, ethnicity and age as determinants of access to natural resources. This also implied critically assessing the extent to which the project participants who consulted in the research represented the diversity of local stakeholders. Finally, in the process of analysing the research results, particular attention was given to the distributive aspects of forest governance initiatives.

An effort was made in relation to the adaptation of the research outputs to formats that allowed more incidence in domestic contexts and among diverse stakeholders. This was attempted by producing policy briefs in different languages (Bahasa Indonesia, French and Portuguese) and audio-visual materials to share the project results with important stakeholders who do not belong to elites.

To conclude, addressing power asymmetries in research partnerships is necessary for implementing socially just practices of knowledge production. Openly discussing project management practices helped advance equitable collaborations, opening up an important space of reflexivity for institutions and researchers working in transnational agreements. Finally, an EDI toolkit on establishing equitable research partnerships can be found as a publication in the Chatham House Forest Governance and Legality website.⁵⁶

Varying well-being benefits and (selective) inclusion

The FSC contributes to material well-being and productivity of certified units managed by IP and forest peoples, helping to boost incomes and structure non-timber forest product (NTFP) chains. However, the FSC has several limitations, particularly for smallholders, Indigenous Peoples and local communities. The FSC is a privately led initiative, and its effectiveness in forest enterprises led by forest communities and other marginalized groups depend substantively on external support, which is often absent. In our research, we verified that smallholders are dependent on supporting entities (either government or more recently private sector) to obtain and maintain FSC certification. Besides lack of support for minoritized groups, interviewees stated that smallholders face constant threats and incursions by land grabbers – a situation that has worsened during Bolsonaro’s presidency, due to weaknesses in monitoring, command and control mechanisms, and government inertia (or in some cases, encouragement of illicit deforestation and illegal logging). It is indeed very challenging for IP, local communities and smallholders to obtain and maintain FSC certification, since its standards and procedures are not easy to navigate or comply with. The insufficient levels of credit and financing for smallholders do not help them to finance FSC certificates. The low levels of support to smallholders in Brazil stands in stark contrast to the budget allocated by the federal government to agribusiness, mining and major infrastructure works.

The Amazon Fund, which received donations from the governments of Norway and Germany, and to a lesser extent from Petrobras (Brazilian oil and gas company), has enabled grassroots organizations, NGOs and community associations to build and strengthen capacities to network and partner in international cooperation. The Amazon Fund contributed to strengthening environmental agencies at the subnational (state) and national (federal) levels. Even when Bolsonaro froze the Fund and dismantled its participatory governance aspect, the legacy of the Amazon Fund was noticeable through the continued efforts made by institutions that it had strengthened in the past. One of the most important impact areas of the Fund⁸¹ is the combination of positive outcomes for both forest conservation and the promotion of community well-being and safety of forest peoples. Amazon Fund initiatives are often associated with the inclusion of women and traditional communities – such as IP and Quilombola communities – in decision-making processes, which have been more respectful of their livelihoods, cultures, knowledge and values.

When both cases are analysed, using the Institutional approach,⁸² we observe that the effectiveness of forest governance is compromised in two ways. These are when stakeholders’ participation is limited, such as by excluding the government, as in the case of the FSC; and when peasant family farmers, IP or local communities are further marginalized. In circumstances where there are low levels of participation, autonomy and empowerment among local stakeholders, a discontinuity of initiatives, dependency and marginalization linked to poor well-being outcomes can be expected, not only in terms of productivity, access to markets and public policies, and income, but also in health, education, institutional capacity, safety, and food and land security.

Lessons learned and recommendations

Both the FSC certification and the Amazon Fund have been important forest governance mechanisms for the Amazon. However, they cannot be considered as unique or sufficient solutions. Both have generated positive impacts on people’s lives, albeit in different domains, but there is still much room to discuss new strategies and actions that governments, funders and investors can enact at national and international levels.

Despite efforts to implement forest governance mechanisms that address sustainability and inclusion at the same time, specific topics still require more attention. Capacity-building is one of them. Actors and institutions depend on knowledge, networks, visibility and capacity for engagement in order to compete and get access to technical and financial support.

Another topic relates to participation. It is crucial to place local and minoritized groups at the centre of decision-making. Listening to local communities, NGOs and subnational governments have meant that funds are directed and spent in a way that respects and values the cultures and livelihoods of diverse populations – who feel more empowered and able to improve their living conditions. At the same time, this approach, which was embedded in the Amazon Fund, has contributed to the enforcement of important instruments of command and control. With Lula returning as president, and the prospects that the Amazon Fund could be co-managed by the central and subnational governments in collaboration with civil society, Norway has committed to resume donations to the Fund.

Coordination between state and non-state actors is therefore key to designing, implementing and improving policies that integrate the social and environmental agendas, promoting sustainability and inclusiveness in the biome. In this sense, international cooperation has a great role to play, helping to build an open, trusting and pragmatic space for negotiation between governments, the private sector, funders, banks, investors, grassroots and civil society organizations.

To achieve this, we recommend that international development funders such as the EU and UK governments create the necessary conditions to enable and broaden out forums for equitable, diverse and inclusive participation of Global South agents and institutions in their forest governance programmes. These should include language interpretation, the right to veto and consideration of local priorities such as food and land security, or the development of solidarity and well-being economies in and around tropical forests. We recommend that government funders also negotiate the implementation of glocal mechanisms that consider and respect national sovereignty.

To banks and investors, our recommendations are: i) to support local/regional initiatives that respect, value and promote sustainable livelihoods and local knowledge as a premise, as well as the inclusion of marginalized populations in just and sustainable supply chains, to the extent that such populations want to engage in such markets; and ii) to halt investments and financing of activities that impact negatively on forest conservation and put at risk the livelihoods and human rights of those in and around the Amazon.

Moreover, we recommend international cooperation to update theories of change and monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL) processes. The social dimensions of forest governance should be thoroughly integrated in theories of change and MEL plans, with the establishment of appropriate indicators and metrics capable of measuring inclusion and well-being, as suggested by Shaafsma and others.⁸³ Reconsidering sustainable livelihoods frameworks linked to political economy analysis could also help rethink and reshape international cooperation.⁸⁴ The expected impacts, outcomes and targets of forest governance mechanisms must go beyond the legal, biophysical or environmental dimensions.

Final remarks

To achieve successful glocal forest governance, ‘global’ initiatives must explicitly incorporate local perspectives through inclusive and participatory design and implementation. International organizations would benefit from ‘glocalizing’ their approach and operations, recognizing the complexities of diverse biomes, and encouraging, sponsoring and listening to independent platforms that convene different economic sectors and groups in society. Our recommendations would contribute to better coordination and deliberation processes. Notably, this will only lead to fair and sustainable outcomes if done through an inclusive coalition that works on territorial or place-based development agendas to address root causes of deforestation.

Finally, we highlight three considerations for policymakers in international cooperation. First, integrate bottom-up and top-down mechanisms into policy strategies. Dialogues must consider the pluralities of situations and local realities. Second, foster and strengthen forest governance arrangements built on inclusive and transformative coalitions. And last, but not least, develop strategies and actions that transcend environmental sustainability or legality, adding the much-needed elements of inclusiveness and socio-economic targets and indicators to the international cooperation agenda.

Views on the moratorium on industrial concessions

For the DRC government, one of the main reasons to lift the moratorium on industrial forest concessions is that maintaining a 20-year-old moratorium is ‘irresponsible’.⁹⁴ DRC officials emphasize the potential for land resources to contribute to revenue collection for the government, to the development of infrastructure, and to the benefit of people. According to the DRC’s General Director of Forests, the DRC ‘is home to 60% of forests in the Congo basin, with strong timber potential – of above 10 million cubic metres per year, and a huge farming potential, of around 80Mha of arable land’.⁹⁵ These resources should be mobilized, the General Director argues, which would be crucial to fulfil the needs of a growing population and infrastructure development. Biodiversity conservation or mitigation of climate change are not evident in this viewpoint.

International NGOs and Congolese civil society differ from the government. Some international NGOs denounced a contradiction between the DRC’s climate and forest commitments and its plan to lift the moratorium on new logging concessions.⁹⁶ International NGOs called attention to the fact that the main beneficiaries of new industrial concessions in the DRC would be foreign companies, and that this would not necessarily create a trickle-down effect. Greenpeace Africa and Rainforest Foundation UK, for instance, submitted a petition to ‘the international community’ calling for action to stop the lifting of the moratorium.⁹⁷

Congolese civil society groups, such as the Groupe de Travail Climat REDD+ Rénové (GTCRR) and the National Coalition Against Illegal Logging (CNCEIB), argue that the DRC still needs to design and define a phased programme to progressively (and responsibly) lift the moratorium – as per the third conditionality created in the 2015 Presidential Decree. This option would respect the rule of law. Congolese civil society has also called for this process to be done through participatory and multi-sectoral means.

Among representatives of IP, some expressed the hope that the allocation of new forest concessions could be helpful if logging companies contributed to the provision of services to local communities, such as education, health, water and transport. Yet grievances against industrial loggers remain widespread, and IP’ representatives underline the need for any new enterprise to respect social obligations and human rights, such as observing Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Our research however, did not explore alternatives to industrial concessions, such as community forest concessions, which have legal underpinnings and support from IP and local communities’ advocates.

We acknowledge that views change, and that differences exist not only between but within groups of actors. This caveat acknowledged, we presented the policy research findings to contribute to the debate in this sector, which is still lacking in data availability, transparency and platforms for dialogue.

Rule of law and development challenges

Forest law enforcement is weak in the DRC.⁹⁸ Despite the 2002–21 moratorium on the expansion of industrial logging, the DRC’s forest administration granted contracts through bilateral negotiations between entrepreneurs and government officials.⁹⁹ Not only were these were unlawful, they also lacked transparency, fairness or competition that a public action should provide.

The General-Inspectorate of Finance (IGF) of the DRC concluded that logging concessions in the two decades between 2000 and 2020 were linked to corruption and benefited personal interests – with consecutive ministers violating the moratorium and failing to facilitate revenue collection.¹⁰⁰ Law enforcement has been selective and arbitrary, with some Ministers enforcing certain laws, while others striking deals at their discretion, according to the IGF.¹⁰¹ Unlawful concessions deprived the government of security deposit payments, which would have offered some protection against defaulting operators.¹⁰² As a result, logs produced in the DRC – albeit in quantities far below other countries in the Congo basin – are more likely to involve illegality now than at the start of the century.¹⁰³

The DRC’s capacity to enact reforms or enforce regulations remains limited. The civil service, for instance, faces numerous challenges, such as poor infrastructure, limited headcount or training on environmental policy, forest resources or land rights. Poor infrastructure limits local capacity for timber processing. There is no political and policy coordination to reconcile risks and opportunities between urbanization, rural development, food, energy and climate security. Regulating control and access to land and natural resources is difficult, in general, and this challenge is even greater in low-income countries with weak governance systems, like the DRC.

Final remarks and recommendations

The arguments of different stakeholders in the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC tackle ecological, climate and local development challenges, and these have not yet been addressed in a systemic manner. International stakeholders have prioritized support to environmental protection in the tropics, including in the Central African region. This is at odds with some of the local priorities and most pressing development challenges, such as the need for rural livelihoods to be strengthened, and for infrastructure and institutional capacities to be built. In our view, international partnerships and finance have encouraged or prescribed standardized and unsuitable frameworks for the DRC, having failed to truly collaborate in understanding and addressing basic needs, local priorities and the concerns of the majority in the Congo basin.

Future international partnerships should aim to, first, learn about the local needs of affected communities, engage with local policy institutes, and then rethink reforms, regulations and action plans. Second, they should encourage coordination between different ministries, for policy coherence. This should be primarily focused on sustainable livelihoods or the well-being of people while also targeting commodity production, trade and environmental targets. Third, international partnerships should support participatory, inclusive, non-partisan design of roadmaps and cross-sectoral plans for sustainable development, and encourage co-management practices for policy delivery with domestic institutions, IP and local communities. Inclusive and deliberative in-country processes, with high levels of quality participation of key stakeholders, including marginalized constituents, should be enabled for the benefit of the forests in the region.

The moratorium on new logging concessions may have stemmed the authorization of mass industrial exploitation of forest lands but it has not stopped illegal practices. Nor has it paved the way for the kinds of governance reforms that the World Bank expected for the economic recovery of the DRC.

How the lifting of the moratorium plays out will depend on the rules that govern new concessions – which need to be revised – and the capacity for law enforcement, monitoring and learning at the country level. Several questions will also need answering, for instance, who would be entitled to manage new concessions? There would be a substantial difference in distributive outcomes if regulations encouraged arrangements like community forest concessions, and if the international community supported business developments led by local producers’ associations, small and medium enterprises. What technical standards for sustainable resource management should be embedded in future land and forest allocations? What would be the role of state agents, grassroots and civil society organizations in monitoring and evaluating such policies and practices? These issues should be addressed soon, in open and transparent forums, so as to contribute ideas and solutions to advance the DRC as a true ‘climate crisis solution country’.

State concessions for industrial logging and plantations

Companies exploiting forest concessions perceive government support and the SVLK’s economic benefits to be moderate to weak.¹¹⁰ Yet, concession holders have generally accepted and expressed satisfaction with SVLK rules, procedures and certification costs. For instance, holders of logging concessions were found to prefer the mandatory SVLK to voluntary mechanisms such as the FSC or the IFCC (Indonesian Forestry Certification Cooperation, which is part of PEFC, the Programme for Endorsement of Forest Certification). However, some companies still apply the voluntary mechanism to expand their international market. The SVLK is a government requirement for exporting, but companies obtain FSC certification as well to attract importers and buyers because the SVLK is less well known at international level.¹¹¹ In 2022, about half of state forest concessions were covered by SVLK certification.¹¹²

Customary forest for Indigenous Peoples

Customary forests are forest lands located in the territory of ‘customary law communities’, outside state forests.¹¹³ By March 2022, Indonesia’s Ancestral Domain Registration Agency counted 17.6 million hectares (ha) of customary and indigenous territories that could potentially be recognized as such.¹¹⁴ Yet, official recognition has been issued for about 16% of this potential (2.78 million ha), or 0.6% of Indonesia’s forested lands. Most customary forests were recognized by subnational authorities,¹¹⁵ while the national government, through its Ministry of Environment and Forestry, had officially recognized 0.09 million ha as customary territories by April 2022.¹¹⁶

With such low levels of recognition of land tenure for IP, their communities have enjoyed limited to no benefits from the SVLK. IP and local communities still struggle for autonomy, including the fight for land tenure recognition.¹¹⁷ Moreover, even if they had land security, the SVLK would not accommodate the heterogeneity of IP and local communities. There are 1,331 ethnic groups recognized by the Indonesian government,¹¹⁸ and not all IP want to be integrated into global supply chains.¹¹⁹

Private smallholding forests

Illegal logging in private smallholding forests is virtually unheard of, particularly when compared to illegal practices in state forest concessions.¹²⁰ Forest products and timber from private smallholding forests can be considered the easiest to control at farm level and the ‘most legal’ timber – when the land is inhabited and closely guarded and protected by smallholders or tenants.

Private forests represent 7% of Indonesia’s forested lands. The limited impacts of the SVLK on smallholder private forests had long been assumed,¹²¹ and this was confirmed in our original field research between 2021 and 2022. Not surprisingly, the benefits of SVLK are not clearly perceived by smallholders. For instance, most smallholder farmers surveyed in Solo¹²² either do not know what SVLK is (5% of 21 respondents) or have not perceived its impacts (76%). The respondents who reported SVLK benefits referred to a sense of pride (9%), commercialization facilities (5%) or better pricing for timber (5%).¹²³ For most smallholders, certification costs and complicated bureaucracies are burdensome, and they need to use the land in a way that is economical. Smallholders face challenges related to tree maintenance, capital and selling, so need more facilitation to cope with these matters than legal certification constraints.

Although smallholders are allowed to issue a SVLK self-declaration of conformity,¹²⁴ intermediaries have traditionally brokered declarations, according to focus group discussions and interviews.¹²⁵ This reduces the potential economic benefit that smallholders could draw from the SVLK.

Final remarks

Indonesia’s FLEGT licensing scheme and SVLK are relatively effective in state forests, but considerably less so in private forests and virtually non-existent in customary forests. This profile of impacts has important distributive implications. Indigenous Peoples, local communities, artisanal producers and smallholders have not enjoyed benefits from the SVLK as much as medium to large operators of logging concessions and timber plantations.

Looking at the profile of benefits distributed, and the effectiveness of the SVLK, it is important to remember its origins and evolution, and to think about its future developments. First, with regards to the origins of the SVLK, it is important to highlight that foreign and international market mechanisms promoted by international agencies and donors have largely informed and motivated Indonesia’s forest policy reforms and integration into global supply chains. Second, on effectiveness, the SVLK has been associated with improving transparency and participation, but there are important misalignments between competing trade, forests policies and sustainable livelihoods. The SVLK took decades to develop (since at least the 2001 Bali Declaration on Forest Law Enforcement and Governance), but its impacts are still not significant enough to lead to more sustainable livelihoods. This has been a particular problem for the most marginalized citizens or populations of Indonesia, such as IP, local communities and smallholders. Third, we understand that the development of such regulations primarily serves the interests of traders, importers and actors in global supply chains, while not necessarily benefiting smallholder farmers (i.e. small private forests). All of this makes the glocalization of forest governance analysis and solutions an important avenue to be pursued.

Future policies and international partnerships should aim to promote sustainable land use and livelihoods, and seriously look at, and prioritize IP, local communities, and smallholders.

We recommend the maintenance of the full SVLK regime for state forests and large-scale concessions, and the creation of strategies and facilities crafted to benefit peoples and communities in private smallholding and customary forests. In the short term, facilities should be created to enable such groups to autonomously issue Self-Declaration of Conformity (SDoC) as legality and credibility assurance. But reforms in governance should go beyond the commodity market regime and observe the actual needs of forest peoples – to whom access to international markets is secondary to several other priorities. For instance, according to the interviews conducted in this research, the acceleration of recognition of customary territories is a priority for IP, as is better technical assistance, insurance and loans, eradication and prevention of pests and diseases, and facilitation of direct sales to the industry for smallholder farmers. Tackling these fundamental needs will help glocalize forest governance solutions and contribute to reducing poverty and inequality whilst safeguarding the climate and nature.

Final remarks

This report was built upon two needs that became opportunities. First, the need to rethink North–South research partnerships in international partnerships which required researchers to identify their own degrees of privilege in an unjust world and to redress power dynamics. Second, the need for more inclusive, participatory and transdisciplinary policy research, which would open up ways for diversity and plurality in the analysis of international policy mechanisms. These needs were taken as a springboard for innovation. We are proud of the collaborative approach adopted to produce this paper, and we invite serious consideration of the analysis and recommendations put forward by the authors in the Global South and the Global North to improve international partnership on land use, forests and sustainable livelihoods. The scale of this partnership is relatively small, but this could be scaled up to encompass other geographies and case studies, to promote diversity and mutual learnings in South–South and South–North–South (triangular) collaborations, and to keep advancing on equitable partnerships for sustainable development.

Transnational forest governance mechanisms need renovation. Market-based solutions and hybrid initiatives for ‘sustainable supply chains’ have been prominent since the 1990s, supported by public, private and hybrid initiatives and international partnerships focused on commodity exchange between Global South and Global North countries. These kinds of interventions can be improved and complemented by stronger environmental laws and public regulations (alongside their implementation) to raise standards that would effectively protect peoples and the environment, and contribute to the well-being of all. Notably, as discussed in this paper, innovation in policy instruments for land-use governance must position well-being and sustainable livelihood outcomes at the core of international partnerships, which in turn should be based on, and enhance, inclusive stakeholder participation.