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Clades Are Reproducers

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Abstract

Exploring whether clades can reproduce leads to new perspectives on general accounts of biological development and individuation. Here we apply James Griesemer’s general account of reproduction to clades. Griesemer’s account of reproduction includes a requirement for development, raising the question of whether clades may be meaningfully said to develop. We offer two illustrative examples of what clade development might look like, though evaluating these examples proves difficult due to the paucity of general accounts of development. This difficulty, however, is instructive about what a general account of development should look like and how it may usefully be applied to research problems (further suggesting a means for evaluating general accounts of development). Reproduction also requires individuation of parent and offspring. We argue that there is no special problem of individuating older and younger clades. The vagaries involved with determining when clades begin, mature, and end are precisely the same as those that arise when the same questions are asked of cells, organisms, or species. Though the question of clade reproduction and selection may still be open, the process of discovery presents new insights into old problems.

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Hamilton, A., Haber, M.H. Clades Are Reproducers. Biol Theory 1, 381–391 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2006.1.4.381

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1162/biot.2006.1.4.381

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