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Diversity of Cooperation in the Tragedy of the Commons

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Killingback, T., Doebeli, M. & Hauert, C. Diversity of Cooperation in the Tragedy of the Commons. Biol Theory 5, 3–6 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1162/BIOT_a_00019

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