Paper

Gradual Belief Change in Children
Eric Schwitzgebel

University of California, Riverside, Calif., USA

Address of Corresponding Author

Human Development 1999;42:283-296 (DOI: 10.1159/000022637)

  Key Words

• Belief
• Cognitive development
• Competence
• Contextualism
• False belief
• Object permanence
• Performance
• Philosophy of mind
• Theory of mind

  Abstract

Major cognitive developments are unlikely to happen instantaneously. Consequently, children must frequently pass through periods of being 'in between' genuine understanding and failure to understand. The current literatures on false belief understanding and object permanence largely fail to recognize the importance of such in-between states of understanding. Recent philosophical accounts of belief also fail to make sufficient room for such in-between states. An approach based on Ryle's [1949] account of belief is recommended and is compared with some other approaches, including the competence/performance approach and contextualist approaches.

Copyright © 1999 S. Karger AG, Basel

  Author Contacts

Eric Schwitzgebel
Department of Philosophy
University of California
Riverside, CA 92521 (USA)
E-Mail eschwitz@citrus.ucr.edu

  Article Information

Number of Print Pages : 14
Number of Figures : 0, Number of Tables : 0, Number of References : 82