Martin Bichler
ABSTRACT
Numerous games studied in microeconomic theory, such as auctions and contests, are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. However, explicit solutions in the form of Bayes-Nash equilibria for such games are only known under highly specific assumptions regarding the agents' prior distributions or utility functions. Given the continuous nature of these games, existing equilibrium solvers cannot be straightforwardly applied and necessitate an additional discretization step.
Index Terms
- Computing Bayes Nash Equilibrium Strategies in Auction Games via Simultaneous Online Dual Averaging
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