Chiara Petrioli
ABSTRACT
The paper concerns a comparative performance evaluation of protocols for two honest parties to securely share a common secret session key in an Underwater Acoustic Sensor Network (UASN) scenario. The simulation-based comparison is performed by implementing in SUNSET SDCS three key exchange protocols and two solutions for implicit certificate distribution. The three key exchange solutions are the Fully Hashed Menezes-Qu-Vanstone, the Hashed One-pass Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (both based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography) and Diffie-Hellman. Certificate distribution is performed via the Elliptic Curve Qu-Vanstone protocol (implicit) and by X.509 certificates (explicit). Combinations of the selected protocols are considered to secure multipath-based communications in UASNs of different size. Investigated metrics concern the energy consumed and the time required to complete the exchange of keys between two nodes. Our results show that implicit certificates-based solutions obtain application-dependent tradeoffs between security and energy efficiency and a level of security comparable to that of the standard, terrestrial combination of Diffie-Hellman with the X.509 explicit certificates.
- J. Heidemann, M. Stojanovic, and M. Zorzi. Underwater sensor networks: Applications, advances and challenges. In Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A, volume 370, pages 158--175, August 2012.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- T. Melodia, H. Khulandjian, L.-C. Kuo, and E. Demirors. Advances in underwater acoustic networking. In Mobile Ad Hoc Networking: Cutting Edge Directions, pages 804--852, Hoboken, NJ, March 5 2013. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.Google ScholarCross Ref
- D. Hankerson, A. J Menezes, and S. Vanstone. Guide to elliptic curve cryptography. Springer, 2004.Google ScholarDigital Library
- A. P. Sarr, V. P. Elbaz, and J. C. Bajard. A secure and efficient authenticated Diffie-Hellman protocol. In Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications, pages 83--98, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2010.Google ScholarCross Ref
- H. Shai and H. Krawczyk. One-pass HMQV and asymmetric key-wrapping. In Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public Key Cryptography Conference on Public Key Cryptography, pages 317--334, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2011.Google Scholar
- C. Petrioli, R. Petroccia, J. R. Potter, and D. Spaccini. The SUNSET framework for simulation, emulation and at-sea testing of underwater wireless sensor networks. Ad Hoc Networks, 34:224--238, 2015.Google ScholarDigital Library
- C. Lal, R. Petroccia, M. Conti, and J. Alves. Secure underwater acoustic networks: Current and future research directions. In Proceedings of IEEE UComms 2016, pages 1--5, August 2016.Google ScholarCross Ref
- G. Cong, Y.and Yang, Z. Wei, and W. Zhou. Security in underwater sensor network. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Communications and Mobile Computing (CMC), volume 1, pages 162--168. IEEE, 2010.Google Scholar
- E. Souza, H.C. Wong, I. Cunha, A.A.F. Loureiro, L.F.M. Vieira, and L.B. Oliveira. End-to-end authentication in under-water sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 18th IEEE International Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC 2013), pages 299--304, Split, Croatia, July 2013.Google ScholarCross Ref
- G. Ateniese, A. Capossele, P. Gjanci, C. Petrioli, and D. Spaccini. SecFUN: Security framework for underwater acoustic sensor networks. In Proceedings of MTS/IEEE OCEANS 2015, pages 1--9, Genova, Italy, May, 18-21 2015.Google ScholarCross Ref
- A. Capossele, G. De Cicco, and C. Petrioli. R-CARP: A Reputation Based channel Aware Routing Protocol for Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks. In Proceedings of ACM WUWNet 2015, pages 37:1--37:6, New York, NY, USA, 2015.Google ScholarDigital Library
- D. Galindo, R. Roman, and J. Lopez. A killer application for pairings: authenticated key establishment in underwater wireless sensor networks. In Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security, pages 120--132. Springer-Verlag, 2008.Google ScholarDigital Library
- R. Sakai, K. Ohgishi, and M. Kasahara. Cryptosystems based on pairing. In Proceedings of the 17th Symposium of Cryptography and Information Security, pages 26--28, 2000.Google Scholar
- R. Barbulescu, P. Gaudry, A. Joux, and E. Thomé. A quasi-polynomial algorithm for discrete logarithm in finite fields of small characteristic. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/400, 2013. http://eprint.iacr.org/.Google Scholar
- A. Capossele, C. Petrioli, G. Saturni, D. Spaccini, and D. Venturi. Securing Underwater Communications: Key Agreement Based on Fully Hashed MQV. In Proceedings of ACM WUWNet 2017, Halifax, Canada, November 6-8 2017.Google ScholarDigital Library
- National Institute of Standards and Technology. Recommended elliptic curves for federal government use. FIPS PUB 186-4, appendix D. 2013.Google Scholar
- SECG. Recommended elliptic curve domain parameters. Standards for Efficient Cryptography Group, Certicom Corp, 2000.Google Scholar
- R. Canetti and H. Krawczyk. Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology, pages 453--474, London, UK, UK, 2001.Google ScholarDigital Library
- M. B. Porter. The BELLHOP manual and user's guide: Preliminary draft, 2011. Heat, Light, and Sound Research, Inc.Google Scholar
- F. Guerra, P. Casari, and M. Zorzi. World ocean simulation system (WOSS): A simulation tool for underwater networks with realistic propagation modeling. In Proceedings of ACM WUWNet 2009, pages 1--8, Berkeley, CA, 3 November 2009.Google ScholarDigital Library
- Evologics. Evologics S2C acoustic modems, 2019.Google Scholar
- S. Basagni, C. Petrioli, R. Petroccia, and D. Spaccini. Channel replay-based performance evaluation of protocols for underwater routing. In Proceedings of MTS/IEEE OCEANS 2014, St. John's, Canada, September, 14-19 2014.Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- Feasibility Study for Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols on Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks
Recommendations
ID2S Password-Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols
In a two-server password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocol, a client splits its password and stores two shares of its password in the two servers, respectively, and the two servers then cooperate to authenticate the client without knowing the ...
Scalable Protocols for Authenticated Group Key Exchange
We consider the problem of authenticated group key exchange among n parties communicating over an insecure public network. A number of solutions to this problem have been proposed; however, all prior provably secure solutions do not scale well and, in ...
Attribute-based authenticated key exchange
ACISP'10: Proceedings of the 15th Australasian conference on Information security and privacyWe introduce the concept of attribute-based authenticated key exchange (AB-AKE) within the framework of ciphertext-policy attribute-based systems. A notion of AKE-security for AB-AKE is presented based on the security models for group key exchange ...
Comments