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Android Root and its Providers: A Double-Edged Sword

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Published:12 October 2015Publication History

ABSTRACT

Android root is the voluntary and legitimate process of gaining the highest privilege and full control over a user's Android device. To facilitate the popular demand, a unique Android root ecosystem has formed where a variety of root providers begin to offer root as a service. Even though legitimate, many convenient one-click root methods operate by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Android system. If not carefully controlled, such exploits can be abused by malware author to gain unauthorized root privilege. To understand such risks, we undertake a study on a number of popular yet mysterious Android root providers focusing on 1) if their exploits are adequately protected. 2) the relationship between their proprietary exploits and publicly available ones. We find that even though protections are usually employed, the effort is substantially undermined by a few systematic and sometimes obvious weaknesses we discover. From one large provider, we are able to extract more than 160 exploit binaries that are well-engineered and up-to date, corresponding to more than 50 families, exceeding the number of exploits we can find publicly. We are able to identify at least 10 device driver exploits that are never reported in the public. Besides, for a popular kernel vulnerability (futex bug), the provider has engineered 89 variants to cover devices with different Android versions and configurations. Even worse, we find few of the exploit binaries can be detected by mobile antivirus software.

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  1. Android Root and its Providers: A Double-Edged Sword

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        CCS '15: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
        October 2015
        1750 pages
        ISBN:9781450338325
        DOI:10.1145/2810103

        Copyright © 2015 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 12 October 2015

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