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Finite state machine based approach to prevent format string attacks

Published:30 September 2011Publication History
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Abstract

In the computer field there are many types of input validation attacks that occur, in which "Format String Overflow Attacks" is one of the most important. Format String Overflow Attacks remain the leading reason of software vulnerability or exploits. Format string bugs result in error such as wrong result type, memory access error and crash and security breach. In this paper , we proposed a Finite state machine which prevents Format String Overflow Attacks in a secure way with the help of several states of FSM. Proper checking against format string overflow bugs can avoid consequences due to exploits of format string overflow bugs. The result of our proposed finite state machine is improving the security problem and provides protection to memory access from any unauthorized user.

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