Kan-Leung Cheng
ABSTRACT
We utilize evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of cooperative societies and the behaviors of individual agents (i.e., players) in it. We present a novel player model based upon empirical evidence from the social and behavioral sciences, stating that: (1) an individual's behavior may often be motivated not only by self-interest but also by the consequences for the others, and (2) individuals vary in their interpersonal social tendencies, which reflect stable personal orientations that influence their choices.
We present series of evolutionary simulations that ratify previous findings on evolution of cooperation, and provide new insights on the evolutionary process of cooperative behavior in a society as well as on the emergence of cooperative societies. Our main experimental result demonstrate that in contrast to previous common knowledge, increasing the value of mutual Reward or increasing mutual Punishment in the Prisoner's dilemma game do not result in the same type of cooperative society: while increasing R does result in a more cooperative society, increasing P does not.
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Index Terms
- Emergence of cooperative societies in evolutionary games
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