Jerry T. Chiang
ABSTRACT
Due to the widespread adoption of the Global Positioning System (GPS), many systems have been designed to use the location information of participants. When these systems confer rights (such as access rights) based on location, such claim must be securely verified in order to prevent attackers from gaining access to resources that should be restricted. Substantial effort has been made on secure location verification; however, previous work does not address the impact of collusion attacks where adversaries share their private keys nor do they address a possible jamming attack where attackers inject a high amount of noise to prevent successful challenge and response receptions. In this paper, we propose a secure multilateration scheme that provides maximal security achievable by any time-of-flight based system that does not employ other verification methods.
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