Mark Klein
ABSTRACT
We consider a tactical data network with limited bandwidth, in which each agent is tracking objects and may have value for receiving data from other agents. The agents are self-interested and would prefer to receive data than share data. Each agent has private information about the quality of its data and can misreport this quality and degrade or otherwise decline to share its data. The problem is one of interdependent value mechanism design because the value to one agent for the broadcast of data on an object depends on the quality of the data, which is privately known to the sender. A recent two-stage mechanism due to Mezzetti (2004) can be modified to our setting. Our mechanism achieves efficient bandwidth allocation and provides incentive compatibility by conditioning payments on the realized value for data shared between agents.
- F. Constantin and D. C. Parkes. On revenue-optimal dynamic auctions for bidders with interdependent values. In Proc. of the Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IX (AMEC'IX), Honolulu, Hawaii, May 2007. Google Scholar
Digital Library
- P. Dasgupta and E. S. Maskin. Efficient auctions. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115:341--388, 2000.Google ScholarCross Ref
- R. Dash, A. Rogers, S. Reece, S. Roberts, and N. R. Jennings. Constrained bandwidth allocation in multi-sensor information fusion: a mechanism design approach. In Proc. of the 8th Int. Conf. on Information Fusion, July 2005.Google ScholarCross Ref
- J. Feigenbaum, M. Schapira, and S. Shenker. Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design. In Algorithmic Game Theory, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2007.Google Scholar
- J. Golliday, C. Leslie. Data link communications in tactical air command and control systems. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, 3(5):779--791, 1985.Google ScholarDigital Library
- T. Groves. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 41:617--631, 1973.Google ScholarCross Ref
- T. Ito and D. C. Parkes. Instantiating the contingent bids model of truthful interdependent value auctions. In Proc. of the 6th Int. Joint Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS), May 2006. Google ScholarDigital Library
- P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu. Efficient design with interdependent valuations. Econometrica, 69:1237--1259, 2001.Google ScholarCross Ref
- M. Klein, D. Plakosh, and K. Wallnau. Using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction mechnanism for enhanced bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks. Technical report CMU/SEI-2008-TR-004, CMU Software Engineering Institute, 2008.Google Scholar
- V. Krishna. Auction Theory. Academic Press, 2002.Google Scholar
- C. Mezzetti. Mechanism design with interdependent valuations: Efficiency. Econometrica, pages 1617--1626, 2004.Google ScholarCross Ref
- D. C. Parkes. Online Mechanisms. In Algorithmic Game Theory, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden, Eva Tardos, and Vijay Vazirani (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2007.Google Scholar
- A. Rogers, R. K. Dash, N. R. Jennings, S. Reece, and S. Roberts. Computational mechanism design for information fusion within sensor networks. In Proc. of the 9th Int. Conf. on Information Fusion, July 2006.Google ScholarCross Ref
- J. Shneidman, D. C. Parkes, and L. Massoulie. Faithfulness in Internet algorithms. In Proc. of the SIGCOMM Workshop on Practice and Theory of Incentives and Game Theory in Networked Systems (PINS), September 2004. Google ScholarDigital Library
- C. Wilson. Network centric warfare: Background and oversight issues for congress. CRS Report RL32411, The Library of Congress, June 2004.Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Handling interdependent values in an auction mechanism for bandwidth allocation in tactical data networks
Recommendations
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerceThe seminal work of [Myerson 1981] shows that the simple Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with monopoly reserves is optimal in single-item auctions where agents have independent and identically distributed private values. [Hartline and Roughgarden ...
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values
EC '13: Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerceThe seminal work of [Myerson 1981] shows that the simple Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with monopoly reserves is optimal in single-item auctions where agents have independent and identically distributed private values. [Hartline and Roughgarden ...
Interdependent Values without Single-Crossing
EC '18: Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and ComputationWe consider a setting where an auctioneer sells a single item to n potential agents with interdependent values. That is, each agent has her own private signal, and the valuation of each agent is a known function of all n private signals. This captures ...
Comments