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Just and Unjust Wars: Casuistry and the Boundaries of the Moral World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Abstract

Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars utilizes a moral doctrine known as casuistry, which applies existing moral norms to practical cases while putting aside the actual origins of morality. Boyle contrasts Walzer's casuistry to other methods of moral judgment, including consequentialism, institutionalism, and deontology. He discusses deontology, which derives precepts from moral principles, particularly making a case with reference to Alan Donagan's The Theory of Morality, which appeared the same year as Just and Unjust Wars. Boyle cites casuistry as a highly practical method, but cautions that it is an insufficient guide in extreme situations for which there are no existing moral norms. Boyle points out that in cases where casuistry fails Walzer he turns to consequentialism, which bases moral decisions upon the likelihood that the benefit of an action will outweigh the harm. Boyle argues that such utilitarian calculation weakens the authority of the moral world by allowing exceptions to moral principles in times of emergency. He concludes that the method of rationalistic deontology provided by Donagan is preferable to Walzer's casuistry.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1997

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References

1 Further references to this work will indicate pages in parentheses within the textGoogle Scholar.

2 Donagan, Alan, The Theory of Morality (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1977Google Scholar).

3 Donagan, 26–32Google Scholar.

4 Donagan, 66–74Google Scholar.

5 Donagan, 76–90Google Scholar.

6 Donagan, 87Google Scholar.

7 See Finnis, John, Boyle, Joseph, and Grisez, Germain, Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 330Google Scholar.

8 Ibid., 178–79, 242–49Google Scholar.

9 Donagan, 207Google Scholar.

10 Nicomachean Ethics, bk. III ch. 1: lll0a, 23–25. The limits of pardoning in such cases are discussed by Donagan, 174–77Google Scholar.

11 Donagan, 184Google Scholar.

12 Donagan, 143–49Google Scholar.

13 See Raz, Joseph, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1986), 257–66Google Scholar.