Skip Navigation

IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences 2008 E91-A(1):283-297; doi:10.1093/ietfec/e91-a.1.283
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to My Personal Archive
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrow Request Permissions
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by NAGAO, W.
Right arrow Articles by OKAMOTO, T.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us  
What's this?

Copyright © 2008 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

Special Section on Cryptography and Information Security -- Papers -- Security Notions

On the Equivalence of Several Security Notions of KEM and DEM

Waka NAGAO1, Yoshifumi MANABE1,2 and Tatsuaki OKAMOTO1,2

1 The authors are with the Graduate School of Informatics, Kyoto University, Kyoto-shi, 606-8501 Japan. E-mail: w-nagao{at}ai.soc.i.kyoto-u.ac.jp; manabe.yoshifumi{at}lab.ntt.co.jp; okamoto.tatsuaki{at}lab.ntt.co.jp, 2 The authors are with NTT Labs, NTT Corporation, Musashino-shi, 180-8585 Japan.


   Abstract

KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism) and DEM (Data Encapsulation Mechanism) were introduced by Shoup to formalize the asymmetric encryption specified for key distribution and the symmetric encryption specified for data exchange in ISO standards on public-key encryption. Shoup defined the "semantic security (IND) against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2)" as a desirable security notion of KEM and DEM, that is, IND-CCA2 KEM and IND-CCA2 DEM. This paper defines "non-malleability (NM)" for KEM, which is a stronger security notion than IND. We provide three definitions of NM for KEM, and show that these three definitions are equivalent. We then show that NM-CCA2 KEM is equivalent to IND-CCA2 KEM. That is, we show that NM is equivalent to IND for KEM under CCA2 attacks, although NM is stronger than IND in the definition (or under some attacks like CCA1). In addition, this paper defines the universally composable (UC) security of KEM and DEM, and shows that IND-CCA2 KEM (or NM-CCA2 KEM) is equivalent to UC KEM and that "IND against adaptive chosen plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IND-P2-C2)" DEM is equivalent to UC DEM.

Key Words: universal composability, KEM, DEM, ISO, IND-CCA2, NM-CCA2, IND-P2-C2, NM-P2-C2


Manuscript received March 16, 2007. Manuscript revised July 16, 2007.


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us    What's this?




Disclaimer:
Please note that abstracts for content published before 1996 were created through digital scanning and may therefore not exactly replicate the text of the original print issues. All efforts have been made to ensure accuracy, but the Publisher will not be held responsible for any remaining inaccuracies. If you require any further clarification, please contact our Customer Services Department.