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A Game Theoretic Framework for Fair-Efficient Threshold Parameters Selection in Call Admission Control for CDMA Mobile Multimedia Systems Jenjoab VIRAPANICHAROEN Watit BENJAPOLAKUL Kiyomichi ARAKI Publication IEICE TRANSACTIONS on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences Vol.E90-A No.7 pp.1280-1291 Publication Date: 2007/07/01 Online ISSN: 1745-1337 DOI: 10.1093/ietfec/e90-a.7.1280 Print ISSN: 0916-8508 Type of Manuscript: Special Section PAPER (Special Section on Multi-dimensional Mobile Information Networks) Category: Keyword: call admission control, game theory, cooperative game, arbitration scheme, CDMA, bargaining problem, Full Text: PDF(801KB)>>
Summary: While efficient use of network resources is an important control objective of call admission control (CAC), the issue of fairness among services should also be taken into account. Game theory provides a suitable framework for formulating such fair and efficient CAC problem. Thus, in this paper, a game theoretic framework for selecting fair-efficient threshold parameters of CAC for the asymmetrical traffic case in CDMA mobile multimedia systems is proposed. For the cooperative game, the arbitration schemes for the interpersonal comparisons of utility and the bargaining problem, including the Nash, Raiffa, and modified Thomson solutions, are investigated. Furthermore, since CAC should be simple and flexible to provide a fast response to diverse QoS call requests during a connection setup, this paper also applies the concept of load factor to the previous Jeon and Jeong's CAC scheme and proposes an approximation approach to reduce the computational complexity (proposed throughput-based CAC scheme). From the numerical results, the proposed throughput-based CAC scheme shows a comparable performance to the previous Jeon and Jeong's CAC scheme while achieving lower computational complexity. All the solutions attain the fairness by satisfying their different fairness senses and efficiency by the Pareto optimality. | ||||||||||
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