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IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics, Communications and Computer Sciences 2006 E89-A(5):1316-1327; doi:10.1093/ietfec/e89-a.5.1316
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Copyright © 2006 The Institute of Electronics, Information and Communication Engineers

Special Section on Discrete Mathematics and Its Applications -- Papers

Enhanced Exhaustive Search Attack on Randomized BSD Type Countermeasure*

Dong-Guk HAN1, Katsuyuki OKEYA2, Tae Hyun KIM1, Yoon Sung HWANG3, Beomin KIM4 and Young-Ho PARK5

1 The authors are with Center for Information and Security Technologies (CIST), Korea University, Seoul, Korea. E-mail: christa{at}korea.ac.kr, 2 The author is with Hitachi, Ltd., Systems Development Laboratory, Kawasaki-shi, 215-0013 Japan., 3 The author is with the Dept. of Mathematics, Korea University, Seoul, Korea., 4 The author is with the Dept. of Philosophy, Korea University, Seoul, Korea., 5 The author is with the Dept. of Information Security, Sejong Cyber Univ., Seoul, Korea.

We propose a new analysis technique against a class of countermeasure using randomized binary signed digit (BSD) representations. We also introduce some invariant properties between BSD representations. The proposed analysis technique can directly recover the secret key from power measurements without information for algorithm because of the invariant properties of BSD representation. Thus the proposed attack is applicable to all countermeasures using BSD representations. Finally, we give the simulation results against some countermeasures using BSD representation such as Ha-Moon method, Ebeid-Hasan method, and the method of Agagliate et al. The results show that the proposed attack is practical analysis method.

Key Words: elliptic curve cryptosystem, side channel attacks, SPA, DPA, BSD representation, Ha-Moon countermeasure, Ebeid-Hasan countermeasure, Agagliate et al.'s countermeasure

Manuscript received August 22, 2005. Manuscript revised November 30, 2005. Final manuscript received December 26, 2005.

* A preliminary version of this paper was presented at ACNS 2004 [9].


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