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In Defense of Reflection

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Simon M. Huttegger
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Abstract

I discuss two ways of justifying reflection principles. First, I propose that an undogmatic reading of dynamic Dutch book arguments provides them with a sound foundation. Second, I show also that minimizing expected inaccuracy leads to a novel argument for reflection principles. The required inaccuracy measures comprise a natural class of functions that can be derived from a generalization of a condition known as propriety or immodesty. This shows that reflection principles are an essential feature not just of consistent degrees of belief but also of degrees of belief that approximate truth.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 413 - 433
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article, I want to thank Kenny Easwaran, Brian Skyrms, Bas van Fraassen, Jonathan Weisberg, Kevin Zollman, and an anonymous referee for this journal.

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