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Abstract

If Aristotelian realists are to establish that mathematics is the science of some properties of the world, they must explain which properties. That is particularly necessary since it is much less obvious what the answer is for mathematics than it is for sciences like physics, biology or sociology. It is clear enough what properties of things physics studies – properties such as mass and attraction (even if it is hard to say what they have in common that makes them physical). Likewise it is clear that biology studies the properties unique to living things. But when the properties of things studied by those special sciences have been listed, what properties are there left over for mathematics to be about? The answer is less than obvious.

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© 2014 James Franklin

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Franklin, J. (2014). Elementary Mathematics: The Science of Quantity. In: An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137400734_4

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