Skip to main content

The Fifth Argument: Frege’s Regress

  • Chapter
Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth

Part of the book series: History of Analytic Philosophy ((History of Analytic Philosophy))

  • 177 Accesses

Abstract

(x) Now is the sense of the sentence an idea? In any case, truth does not consist in correspondence of the sense with something else, for otherwise the question of whether something is true would get reiterated to infinity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 99.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 2012 Ulrich Pardey

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Pardey, U. (2012). The Fifth Argument: Frege’s Regress. In: Frege on Absolute and Relative Truth. History of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137012234_12

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics