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Uncertain Strategic Situation and Rise of Competing Recommendations toward Korea

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American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882–1950 and After

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Abstract

The United States strove to implement the trusteeship plan and unify the two zones of occupation, while dealing with the difficulties arising from its unprepared occupation of southern Korea. But by early 1947, due to its limited resources and the complex political development in Korea, it had to make a clear choice regarding its costly military occupation of South Korea.

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Notes

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© 2009 Seung-young Kim

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Kim, Sy. (2009). Uncertain Strategic Situation and Rise of Competing Recommendations toward Korea. In: American Diplomacy and Strategy toward Korea and Northeast Asia, 1882–1950 and After. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230621688_9

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