The Aims of Interpretation

Abstract

The view of interpretation advocated so far holds that interpretations are answers to different sorts of representational questions and that interpretation contains a necessary contextual element which has to be understood in order to grasp the nature of interpretation. Questions depend on what the questioner wants to know, and the relevance of the question, as well as the answer, is determined partially by the background assumptions of both interpreter and interpretee. Thus, one kind of interpretation is explanation of meaning; another kind is construction of meaning. At first glance, this pragmatic analysis of interpretation and explanation does not seem very much different from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutic view of interpretation, a view which regards an interpretation as an answer to a question raised by a text. But, in spite of the fact that both approaches consider interpretation to be part of an interrogative interchange, there are some fundamental differences between these two views. Those differences are concerned with establishing a scientific understanding of a text. Where the pragmatic-naturalistic approach sees the usual scientific interpretation of a text as an explanation of meaning, Gadamer—and even more radical postmodern authors—always assume interpretation to be a construction of meaning. This contrast of opinions is due to the significant divergence in their views about the aims of interpretation within the so-called interpretive disciplines.