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Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview

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Abstract

The interaction of monetary and fiscal policies is a crucial issue in a highly integrated economic area such as the European Union. This paper analyzes the design of monetary and fiscal policies in the EMU. To do so, the paper starts with an overview of the most important aspects. Next, it analyzes monetary and fiscal policy interaction in a stylized model of a monetary union, in which monetary and fiscal policy design is modeled as a dynamic stabilization game. Macroeconomic policy making and adjustment are studied under alternative forms of cooperation and in both symmetric and asymmetric settings.

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van Aarle, B., Di Bartolomeo, G., Engwerda, J. et al. Monetary and Fiscal Policy Design in the EMU: An Overview. Open Economies Review 13, 321–340 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020609312575

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1020609312575

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