Abstract
We consider a supply function equilibrium (SFE) model of interaction in an electricity market. We assume a linear demand function and consider a competitive fringe and several strategic players having capacity limits and affine marginal costs. The choice of SFE over Cournot equilibrium and other models and the choice of affine marginal costs is reviewed in the context of the existing literature. We assume that bid rules allow affine or piecewise affine non-decreasing supply functions by firms and extend results of Green and Rudkevitch concerning the linear SFE solution. An incentive compatibility result is proved. We also find that a piecewise affine SFE can be found easily for the case where there are non-negativity limits on generation. Upper capacity limits, however, pose problems and we propose an ad hoc approach. We apply the analysis to the England and Wales electricity market, considering the 1996 and 1999 divestitures. The piecewise affine SFE solutions generally provide better matches to the empirical data than previous analysis.
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Baldick, R., Grant, R. & Kahn, E. Theory and Application of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium in Electricity Markets. Journal of Regulatory Economics 25, 143–167 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:REGE.0000012287.80449.97
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:REGE.0000012287.80449.97