Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the scope for conflict between national merger control agencies which simultaneously assert jurisdictions. We consider a positive model of merger control in which market definition and the analysis of dominance are both explicitly specified. Our main finding is that conflict in international merger control is less likely to occur when economic integration is high. Hence, economic integration should alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict. In addition, we observe that conflict is more likely to arise between countries of similar market size and for moderate competition policy rules.
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Neven, D.J., Röller, LH. On the Scope of Conflict in International Merger Control. Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 3, 235–249 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JICT.0000026853.40437.34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:JICT.0000026853.40437.34