Skip to main content
Log in

Can there be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference?

  • Published:
Erkenntnis Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

There are two interpretations of what it means for a singular term to be referentially direct, one truth-conditional and the other cognitive. It has been argued that on the former interpretation, both proper names and indexicals refer directly, whereas on the latter only proper names are directly referential. However, these interpretations in fact apply to the same singular terms. This paper argues that, if conceived in purely normative terms, the linguistic meaning of indexicals can no longer be held to make these terms referentially indirect under the second interpretation. This result is then generalized to proper names, by ascribing them a normative meaning as well.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

REFERENCES

  • Almog, J.: 1984, 'Semantic Anthropology', Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, pp. 479–489.

    Google Scholar 

  • Austin, J.L.: 1976, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Boghossian, P.A.: 1994, 'The Transparency of Mental Content', Philosophical Perspectives 8, pp. 33–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Donnellan, K.S.: 1966, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', The Philosophical Review 75, pp. 281–304.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dummett, M.: 1981, Frege: Philosophy of Language, Duckworth, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, G.: 1973, 'The Causal Theory of Names', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 47, pp. 187–208.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D.: 1979, 'Dthat', in French, P.A. et al. (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language, University of Minneapolis Press, Minneapolis, pp. 383–400.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D.: 1989a, 'Demonstratives', in Almog, J. et al. (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 481–563.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, D.: 1989b, 'Afterthoughts', in Themes from Kaplan cit., pp. 565–614.

  • Kaplan, D.: 1990, 'Words', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 64, pp. 93–119.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S.: 1980, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Leonardi, P.: 1990, 'On Hector-Neri Castañeda's Proper Name', in Jacobi, K. and Pape, H. (eds.), Thinking and the Structure of the World, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 230–243.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marconi, D.: 2002, 'The Normative Element in Semantic Theory', in Hinzen, W. and Rott, H., (eds.), Belief and Meaning, Essays at the Interface. Philosophical Analysis 3, German Library of Sciences, Hänsel-Hohenhausen, Frankfurt a.M.: pp. 215–228.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martí, G.: 1995, 'The Essence of Genuine Reference', Journal of Philosophical Logic 24, pp. 275–289.

    Google Scholar 

  • Martí, G.: 2001, 'Reassessing the Semantic Significance of the Referential/Attributive Distinction', paper presented at the conference David Kaplan: From This to That and From Ouch to Oops, University of S. Marino, 10-13 May, 2001.

  • Martí, G.: 2003, 'The Question of Rigidity in New Theories of Reference', Noûs 37, pp. 161–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDowell, J.: 1998, 'The Woodbridge Lectures 1997: Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant and Intentionality', The Journal of Philosophy 95, pp. 431–492.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C.: 1989, Mental Content, Blackwell: Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Napoli, E.: 1995, '(Direct) Reference', Journal of Philosophical Logic 24, pp. 321–339.

    Google Scholar 

  • Newen, A.: 1998, 'Reference and Reference Determination: The Interpretational Theory', in Voltolini, A. (ed.), Reference, Thought, and Context(Lingua e stile 33 1998), Il Mulino: Bologna, pp. 515–529.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pelczar, M. and Rainsbury, J.: 1998, 'The Indexical Character of Names', Synthese 114, pp. 293–317.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J.: 1997, 'Indexicals and Demonstratives', in Hale, B. and Wright, C. (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 586–612.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perry, J.: 2001, Reference and Reflexivity, CSLI Publications, Stanford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F.: 1993, Direct Reference, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Recanati, F.: 1994, 'Processing Models for Non-literal Discourse', in Casati, R. et al. (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Hoölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Vienna, pp. 343–356.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reimer, M.: 1991, 'Demonstratives, Demonstrations, and Demonstrata', Philosophical Studies 63, 187–202.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, P.: 1950, 'On Referring', Mind 59, 320–344.

    Google Scholar 

  • Voltolini, A.: 1995, 'Indexinames', in Hill, J. and Kot'àtko, P. (eds.), Karlovy Vary Studies in Reference and Meaning, Filosofia-Φιϰoσoϕια Publications, Prague, pp. 258–285.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yagisawa, T.: 1998, 'Naming and Its Place in Reference', in Reference, Thought, and Context cit., pp. 445–458.

  • Wettstein, H.: 1984, 'How to Bridge the Gap Between Meaning and Reference', Synthese 58, pp. 63–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wettstein, H.: 1986, 'Has Semantics Rested on a Mistake?', The Journal of Philosophy 83, pp. 185–209.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wittgenstein, L.: 1952, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Voltolini, A. Can there be a Uniform Application of Direct Reference?. Erkenntnis 61, 75–98 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037521.46052.17

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:ERKE.0000037521.46052.17

Keywords

Navigation