Abstract
The status quo plays a central role in both the positive and normative analysis associated with the constitutionalist and contractarian perspective. This paper reviews the status of the status quo in this context by identifying and addressing a series of questions relating to the definition, emergence and value of the status quo.
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Buchanan, J.M. The Status of the Status Quo . Constitutional Political Economy 15, 133–144 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000029639.96250.45
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:COPE.0000029639.96250.45