Abstract
In this paper we build uponexisting literature on the evolution of thecommon law. We consider a model of legalevolution in which judges have varyingideologies and propensities to extend thedomain of legal remedies and causes ofaction. Parties have symmetric stakes andare rational. Plaintiffs bring a case tocourt if the expected net return from thecase is positive. The net expected value ofthe case depends on the objective merits ofthe case, the state of the law, and theideological propensity of the judge.Plaintiffs have full control over whetherto bring a case to court. In our model, thecombined presence of differences in judges'ideology and plaintiff's case selectiongenerate a monotonic upward trend in theevolution of legal rules and remedies. This may explain the stylized fact underwhich certain areas of the law have beengranting increasing levels of remedialprotection and recognition of plaintiffs'actions.
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Fon, V., Parisi, F. Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model. Public Choice 116, 419–433 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024822710849
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1024822710849