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The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutional breakthrough or institutional nightmare

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Abstract

The Clean Development Mechanism, defined in ArticleXII of the Kyoto Protocol to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, is a crucial instrument to enlist developing countries’ participation in emissions limitation, to reduce industrialized countries’ compliance costs, and to facilitate resource and technology transfers. However, the CDM contains perverse compliance incentives and is beset with problems of credit definition, monitoring, enforcement, and potentially high transactions costs. This paper defines some important design safeguards and suggests an alternative approach should the Kyoto Protocol eventually be renegotiated.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of Colorado at Denver, Visiting Professor, Yale School of Forestry and Environment Studies, and Senior Advisor to Stratus Consulting, Inc, USA

    Robert Repetto (Senior Fellow of the Wirth Chair at the Graduate School of Public Affairs at the)

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  1. Robert Repetto
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Repetto, R. The Clean Development Mechanism: Institutional breakthrough or institutional nightmare. Policy Sciences 34, 303–327 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012603007614

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