Abstract
This paper uses the quarterly conference call as a disclosure metric to examine whether firms with less informative financial statements are more likely to respond by providing additional voluntary disclosure. After controlling for other characteristics of a firm's information environment, I find a significant inverse relation between measures of the informativeness of a firm's financial statements and the likelihood that the firm will use a quarterly conference call. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis in Verrecchia (1990) that the probability of disclosure of management's private information is negatively related to the precision of prior public information on firm value.
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Tasker, S.C. Bridging the Information Gap: Quarterly Conference Calls as a Medium for Voluntary Disclosure. Review of Accounting Studies 3, 137–167 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009684502135
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009684502135