Skip to main content
Log in

A framework for the analysis of corruption

  • Published:
Crime, Law and Social Change Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The article sets out a framework within which the problem of corruption may be analysed in any specific country. It does not seek to establish the importance of such activity in a general sense, or seek to propose particular economic policy or institutional programmes that should be pursued in order to reduce the impact on the development process. Rather, the objective is to provide a structure for two distinct areas of analysis. Firstly, it considers the investigation of the determinants of corruption, emphasising the environment in which corruption evolves — whether shaped by international, national or specific institutional factors — and the manner in which the different parties to corruption interact and organise themselves in conducting these activities. Secondly, the article focusses on the importance of corruption for economic development by considering the different forms of corruption and the characteristics of these forms that are most critical for economic activity. Here, the distortions that are introduced into on-going economic activity are identified, together with the manner in which these distortions redirect activity in sub-optimal directions. In addition, the nature of the uncertainty attaching to these differing forms of corruption is considered, and especially the degree to which a form may be considered anarchic or structured in character: the former reflecting a system of intense uncertainty, and the latter one of less uncertainty — perhaps, only minimal uncertainty — as a predictable and stable set of relationships between parties is established. Finally, the article reviews the empirical work that has been undertaken in this field. This article, therefore, seeks to identify how detailed case study analysis, focussed on individual countries — and, indeed, on specific institutions or sectors within those countries — could valuably complement these existing studies, and provide a framework for those seeking to design policy that is appropriate to any individual circumstance.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1995a) “Competition and Corruption”, unpublished, Oxford University.

  • Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1995b), “The New Economics of Corruption: a Survey and Some New Results”, unpublished, Oxford University.

  • M.S. Alam (1990) “Some Economic Costs of Corruption in LDCs”, Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 27, No.1, October.

  • Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik (1994) “Distributive Politics and Economic Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109.

  • J.-C. Andvig (1991) “The Economics of Corruption: a Survey”, Studi Economici, Vol. 46, No.43, pp. 57-94.

    Google Scholar 

  • J.-C. Andvig and Karl Ove Moene (1990) “How Corruption may Corrupt”, Journal of Economic Behavior and OrganisationVol. 13, pp. 63-76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pranab Bardhan (1996) “The Economics of Corruption in Less Developed Countries: a Review of the Issues”, OECD Development Centre, Paris.

    Google Scholar 

  • Silvio Borner, Aymo Brunetti and Beatrice Weder (1995) Political Credibility and Economic DevelopmentMacmillan, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aymo Brunett (1995) “Political Variables in Cross-Country Growth Analysis”, unpublished, Department of Economics, Harvard University.

  • Timothy Besley and John Mclaren (1993) “Taxes and Bribery: the Role of Wage Incentives”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 103, pp. 119-141, January.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paul Collier (1995) “The Domain of African Government”, paper prepared for the SAREC International Colloquium on New Directions in Development Economics - Growth, Equity, and Sustainable Development.

  • Peter Eigen (1995) “Coalition Building for Islands of Integrity”, paper presented to the OECD Symposium on Corruption and Good Governance, Paris.

  • Peter B. Evans and James Rauch (1995) “Bureaucratic Structures and Economic Performance in Less Developed Countries”, IRIS Working PaperNo. 175, August.

  • Monday Ekpo (1979) “Gift-Giving and Bureaucratic Corruption in Nigeria”, in Monday Ekpo (ed), Bureaucratic Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa, Causes Consequences, and Controls, University Press of America, Washington DC.

    Google Scholar 

  • David Gould and Jose Amaro-Reyes (1983) “The Effects of Corruption on Administrative Performance: Illustration from Developing Countries”, World Bank Staff Working PapersNo. 580.

  • Arnold J. Heidenheimer (1970) Political Corruption: Readings in Comparative Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1997) “Why Don't Poor Countries Catch Up?: a Cross-National Test of an Institutional Explanation”, Economic Inquity, Vol. 35, No.3, July.

  • Philip Keefer and Stephen Knack (1994) “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures”, Economics and Politics, Vol. 7, No.3, November.

  • Robert Klitgaard (1995a) “National and International Strategies for Reducing Corruption”, paper presented to the OECD Symposium on Corruption and Good Governance, Paris.

  • Robert Klitgaard (1995b) “Institutional Adjustment and Adjusting to Institutions”, World Bank Discussion PaperNo. 303.

  • Robert Klitgaard (1988) Controlling CorruptionUniversity of California Press, Berkeley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Anne Krueger (1974) “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society”, American Economic ReviewJune.

  • Jean-Jacques Laffont (1995) “Controles de Prix et Economie des Institutions en Chine”, unpublished.

  • Nathaniel Leff (1979) “Economic Development through Bureaucratic Corruption”, in Ekpo ed. (1979)

  • Paolo Mauro (1995) “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, August, pp. 681-712.

  • Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1991) “Why is Rent-Seeking so Costly to Growth?”, American Economic Review, May.

  • Kevin Murphy, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1991), “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107.

  • J.S. Nye, (1979), “Corruption and Political Development: a Cost Benefit Analysis”, in Ekpo (ed.).

  • Obasanjo, O. (1994), Letter to the Financial Times, 14 October.

  • OECD (1994) Recommendations of the Council on Bribery in International Business Transactions, May.

  • OECD (1994) DAC Orientation on Participatory Development and Good Governance.

  • Mancur Olson (1982) The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mancur Olson (1995) “Why Poor Economic Policies Must Promote Corruption: Lessons from the East for All Countries”, paper presented at the Conference on Institutions and Economic Organisation in the Advanced Economies: the Governance Perspective”, Rome.

  • Robert Pindyck (1991) “Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment”, Journal of Economic LiteratureVol. 29, pp. 1110-1148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robert Putnam (1993) Making Democracy Work, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ.

    Google Scholar 

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman (1994) “Reducing Bribery in the Public-sector”, in Duc V Trange ed. Corruption and Democracy: Political Institutions, Processes and Corruption in Transition States in East-Central Europe and in the former Soviet UnionInstitute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy, Budapest.

    Google Scholar 

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman (1995) “Proposal for Research on the Level and Impact of Corruption in International Business”, unpublished.

  • Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978) Corruption: a Study in Political EconomyAcademic Press, New York.

    Google Scholar 

  • Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (1993) “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 108, No.3.

  • Andrei Shleifer (1994) “Establishing Property Rights”, in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1994.

  • Michael Smith (1979) “Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption among the Hausa of Nigeria”, in Ekpo ed.

  • Morris Szeftel (1982) “Political Graft and the Spoils System in Zambia: the State as a Resource in Itself”, Review of African Political EconomyVol. 24, May-August.

  • Vito Tanzi (1994) “Corruption, Governmental Activities, and Markets”, IMF Working PaperNo. 94/99.

  • Transparency International (1995) Building a Global Coalition Against Corruption.

  • Robert Wade (1985) “The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State is not Better at Development”, World Development, Vol. 13 No.4.

  • World Bank (1995) A Continent in Transition: Sub-Saharan Africa in the Mid-1990s, Oxford University Press.

  • World Bank (1993) The East Asian MiracleOxford University Press.

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Goudie, A., Stasavage, D. A framework for the analysis of corruption. Crime, Law and Social Change 29, 113–159 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008369307796

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008369307796

Keywords

Navigation