Abstract
International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation.
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Barret, S. On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making. Environ Resource Econ 11, 317–333 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008243528330
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008243528330