Abstract
According to Putnam the reference of natural kind terms is fixed by the world, at least partly; whether two things belong to the same kind depends on whether they obey the same objective laws. We show that Putnam's criterion of substance identity only “works” if we read “objective laws” as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. Moreover, at least some of the laws of some of the special sciences have to be included. But what we consider to be good special sciences and what not depends upon our values. Hence, “objective laws” cannot be read as “OBJECTIVE LAWS”. It follows that the reference of natural kind terms cannot be fixed by the world, not even partly. The final conclusion applies to a variety of realisms.
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Douven, I., van Brakel, J. Can the World Help Us in Fixing the Reference of Natural Kind Terms?. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 29, 59–70 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008201511451
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008201511451