Abstract
Dynamic doxastic logic (DDL) is used in connexion with theories of belief revision. Here we try to show that languages of DDL are suitable also for discussing aspects of default logic. One ingredient of our analysis is a concept of coherence-as-ratifiability.
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Segerberg, K. Default Logic as Dynamic Doxastic Logic. Erkenntnis 50, 333–352 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005546526502
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005546526502