Abstract
Interest in demand revealing mechanisms for providing public goods has both waned and then renewed over the past two decades. The possibility of using such mechanisms in different venues than originally anticipated sparked the research reported here. The specific motivation for this paper is to conduct a series of simple direct tests of one version of the class of mechanisms. Failure of demand revelation was much more expensive than we had expected, even when compared to previous research with related mechanisms. The reason for this remains an open question.
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Attiyeh, G., Franciosi, R. & Isaac, R.M. Experiments With the Pivot Process for Providing Public Goods. Public Choice 102, 93–112 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005025416722
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005025416722