Abstract
In this paper we consider, and reject, Harold Langsam’s defenceof the Theory of Appearing, in this journal (1997), in the faceof three standard arguments against it. These arguments are:the argument from hallucination; the argument from the samecause-same effect principle; and the argument from perceptualtime-gap.
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Djukic, G., Popescu, V.B. A Critique of Langsam's “The Theory of Appearing Defended”. Philosophical Studies 112, 69–91 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022538609397
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022538609397