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The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test

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Abstract

An empirical version of the Lerner index is used to investigate the market power effects of U.S. firms seeking protection under current antidumping law. The market power consequences are examined for each of the three possible resolutions of an antidumping investigation: petition for relief accepted (and duties levied), petition rejected, or petition withdrawn. For each outcome an industry case study is presented and the market power analysis conducted. The results contained herein support the hypothesis that U.S. firms receiving protection enhance their domestic market power, while firms having their petition rejected experience a decrease in market power. The evidence is less clear for plaintiffs who withdraw their antidumping petition prior to its final resolution.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dept. of Economics, Cleveland State University, E. 24th & Euclid Ave., Cleveland, OH, 44115, U.S.A

    James F. Nieberding

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  1. James F. Nieberding
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Nieberding, J.F. The Effect of U.S. Antidumping Law on Firms' Market Power: An Empirical Test. Review of Industrial Organization 14, 65–84 (1999). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007719609300

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