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Promulgation and the law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 February 2007

Claire Grant*
Affiliation:
School of Law, Birkbeck College, University of London

Abstract

This is a paper about promulgation, and whether it is a sine qua non of law. The promulgation question has been treated occasionally in the jurisprudential literature, although typically only as a subordinate theorem. This paper does not attempt a thorough conspectus, seeking rather to serve as an introductory to what is a longstanding problem of general interest and concern. An argument for the proposition that laws are things that can be known will be distinguished from two other ways of responding to the promulgation question, which may be attributed respectively to the late H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller. The paper defends this proposition about artefactuality and access, and deals with a number of awkward consequences that appear to ensue from its acceptance.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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